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ABSTRACT
Essays on Housing and Land Economics
by
Gabriel M. Ehrlich
Chair: Robert B. Barsky
This dissertation comprises three chapters examining the economics of the hous-
ing and land markets. In “A Model of Sales, Prices, and Liquidity in the Housing
Market,” I use a search and matching model of the housing market to address three
main questions. First, what model of search and price determination best describes
the housing market? Second, can a general equilibrium model generate the observed
correlations between housing market variables? Third, what shocks have driven the
historical behavior of the housing market? A model of competitive search is more
likely than a model featuring random search and bargaining. Simulated data from
the model qualitatively matches the correlations between housing market time se-
ries. Finally, the recent housing boom and bust were associated with an increase and
subsequent decrease in the pool of eligible buyers, in addition to unrealized expec-
tations of higher future productivity, the estimated size of which suggests a role for
unwarranted optimism on the part of housing market participants.
In “Metropolitan Land Values and Housing Productivity,” David Albouy and I
present the first nationwide index of directly-measured land values and investigate
viii
their relationship with housing prices. Construction prices and geographic and regu-
latory constraints increase the cost of housing relative to land. On average, one-third
of housing costs are due to land, and the elasticity of substitution between land and
other inputs is one-half. Conditional on input prices, housing productivity is low in
larger cities. The increase in housing costs associated with greater regulation appears
to outweigh any benefits from improved quality-of-life.
In “Price and Time to Sale Dynamics in the Housing Market: the Role of Incom-
plete Information,” I propose a model of the house-selling process in which sellers
possess incomplete information regarding the state of the market. This model gen-
erates a negative correlation between house prices and time on market, a result that
can persist even when realtors possess complete information. I construct an empirical
measure of homeowner misperceptions regarding the state of the housing market, and
show that sales volumes are negatively correlated with an increase in homeowners’




This dissertation comprises three chapters, which study the economics of the hous-
ing and land markets from three different perspectives. The first chapter presents a
general equilibrium macroeconomic model of the housing market and uses it to study
several interesting features of the housing market time series data, as well as to in-
fer what shocks have driven the behavior of the housing market over the past thirty
years. The second chapter presents a locational equilibrium model for a system of
cities, along with an index of land values for United States metropolitan areas con-
structed from a database of vacant land sales, which together provide estimates of
the cost function for producing housing services. The third chapter presents a partial
equilibrium model of the home selling process in which sellers possess incomplete in-
formation about the state of the housing market, and demonstrates that empirically,
misperceptions about housing market conditions have economically meaningful effects
on market outcomes. I summarize each chapter in more detail below.
In the first chapter, “A Model of Sales, Prices, and Liquidity in the Housing Mar-
ket,” I embed a search and matching model of the housing market into a dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium framework and use it to address three main questions.
First, what model of search and price determination best describes the housing mar-
ket? Second, can a general equilibrium model generate the observed correlations
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between housing market variables? Third, what shocks have driven the historical
behavior of the housing market, especially the recent boom and bust in house prices?
I calibrate the parameters that determine the steady state of the model and esti-
mate the parameters of the shock process using the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm,
a standard Bayesian method. The search and matching process in my model gives
rise to a ‘match surplus’ between buyers and sellers when a match is formed: both
parties can benefit from transacting immediately rather than continuing to search.
I show that a model of price determination in which the division of the match sur-
plus between the two parties depends on ‘market tightness’, or the ratio of buyers
to sellers in the market, matches the data better than the more traditional model
of price determination in which the division of the match surplus is fixed over time.
Simulated data from the model qualitatively matches the correlations between key
housing market time series, although quantitatively the fit is disappointing for some
time series. Finally, the recent housing boom and bust were associated with a large
increase and subsequent decrease in the pool of eligible buyers, in addition to expec-
tations of higher future productivity that turned out not to be realized. However, the
estimated size of the anticipated increase in productivity during the housing boom
suggests a role for unwarranted optimism on the part of housing market participants.
In the second chapter, “Metropolitan Land Values and Housing Productivity,”
David Albouy and I present the first nationwide index of directly-measured land
values by metropolitan area and investigate their relationship with housing prices.
We show that construction prices and geographic and regulatory constraints increase
the cost of housing relative to land. On average, approximately one-third of housing
costs are due to land. The elasticity of substitution between land and other inputs
into housing is about one-half, implying that the cost share of land ranges from 11
to 49 percent in our sample. Conditional on land and construction prices, housing
productivity is relatively low in larger cities. Housing productivity is generally low
2
on the East and West coasts and high in the interior of the country. The increase
in housing costs associated with greater regulation appears to outweigh any benefits
from improved quality-of-life.
In the third chapter, “Price and Time to Sale Dynamics in the Housing Market:
the Role of Incomplete Information,” I propose a stylized model of the house-selling
process in which sellers possess incomplete information regarding the state of the
housing market. The model generates a negative correlation between house prices
and time on the market as observed in the time series data. This result can persist
in the presence of realtors with complete information as long as sellers’ and realtors’
incentives are imperfectly aligned. I construct empirical measures of homeowner per-
ceptions of house prices at the state and metropolitan area levels using data from the
American Community Survey. I compare these measures to indices of house prices
based on market transactions to construct a ‘misperceptions index’ of house prices.
Empirically, sales volumes are negatively correlated with an increase in homeowners’
perceptions of house prices relative to actual market conditions: homeowner misper-




A Model of Sales, Prices, and Liquidity in the
Housing Market
2.1 Introduction
Historically, house prices have been positively correlated with sales volumes and
starts, which have been negatively correlated with housing market liquidity and the
vacancy rate. However, despite a growing literature examining the housing mar-
ket through the lens of search and matching models, it remains unclear how well a
dynamic general equilibrium model featuring search and matching frictions in the
housing market can replicate these patterns. Ideally, a model that is able to replicate
housing market dynamics successfully would also improve our inference concerning
what shocks drive the housing market, and more specifically, what accounts for the
recent boom and bust cycle in the U.S. housing market.
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 illustrate some of the key housing market time series using
U.S. data. Figure 2.1 shows detrended GDP, house prices, and home sales, while
Figure 2.2 shows housing starts, months’ supply (the inventory of homes listed for
sale divided by the number of sales in a month), and the homeowner vacancy rate over
the period 1982Q3-2010Q4.1 Several empirical regularities, summarized in Table 2.1,
1All series are in logs and have been linearly detrended and seasonally adjusted. Please see section
3.2, Observed Data Series, for details of the series’ construction.
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emerge from the figure. First, house prices, sales volumes, and vacancies are much
more volatile than GDP, while housing starts and months’ supply are more volatile
still. Second, GDP, prices, sales, and starts all comove positively, while months’
supply and vacancies comove negatively with sales and starts. Ideally, a theory of
search and matching in the housing market would account for many of these empirical
regularities.
A substantial literature has examined search frictions in the housing market both
empirically and theoretically. Rosen and Topel (1988) find that time to sale has a large
effect on new construction in the U.S. over the period 1963-1983. Following Wheaton’s
(1990) seminal model, a number of papers have taken a search and matching approach
to the housing market. Recently, Diaz and Jerez (2009) and Head et al. (2010) have
examined different models of search and price determination in this context. Aqeel
(2009) and Magnus (2010) both illustrate the difficulty of matching the joint dynamics
of key housing market time series such as prices, starts, and vacancies.
Identifying what shocks drive the housing market has been a topic of significant
research interest recently, but no consensus has emerged. Some authors, such as Ia-
coviello and Neri (2010) and Wheaton and Nechayev (2008) offer fundamentals-based
explanations. Others, such as Kahn (2008) and Lambertini et al. (2010) emphasize
households’ learning process concerning the economy. Finally, many authors, such
as Case and Shiller (2003) and Piazzesi and Schneider (2009) argue that unrealis-
tic expectations of future price appreciation were a key driver in the housing boom,
implying that the recent boom and bust in prices was an irrational bubble.
Thus, there appear to be a number of open questions in the area of housing search.
First, can a search and matching model of the housing market match the observed
behavior of housing prices, sales, and construction over the business cycle? Second,
what model of search and price determination best describes the housing market?
Third, what types of shocks drive fluctuations in the housing sector?
5
I embed a search and matching model of the housing market into a DSGE frame-
work and use it to address these questions. I consider both random search and bar-
gaining and competitive search models, and compare the two statistically. I consider
the role of several shocks in the model: housing productivity shocks, consumption pro-
ductivity shocks, and “eligible buyer” shocks meant to represent changes in financing
conditions. Crucially, I allow for “news shocks” to consumption productivity, in which
agents anticipate changes in productivity ahead of time. I estimate the parameters of
the shock process using the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm and the historical shocks
hitting the housing market using the Kalman filter. Finally, I simulate data from the
estimated model and compare it to the historical data.
My model replicates most of the key patterns in the U.S. housing market qualita-
tively. Price, sales, and starts are positively correlated, while prices comove strongly
with GDP. Furthermore, starts are negatively correlated with months’ supply of hous-
ing. Contrary to the data, starts are negatively correlated with GDP, although this
correlation is not statistically significant. Data simulated from the competitive search
model matches the historical correlations better than data from the random search
model. The competitive search model performs better because the division of the
match surplus depends on the state of the housing market: when more buyers enter
the market, sellers receive a higher share of the surplus, increasing prices. Competi-
tive search thus helps to generate the positive co-movement between prices and sales
volumes that is prominent in the data.
I compare the random and competitive search models in terms of their posterior
marginal densities. The higher likelihood of the competitive model constitutes “de-
cisive evidence” in its favor according to the guidelines of DeJong and Dave (2007).
Therefore, I use the competitive search model as my baseline specification, although
I report estimation results for both models.
I estimate the historical shocks that hit the economy over the last thirty years
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using the Kalman filter. The estimates imply that the housing boom from 1997 to
2006 had two primary causes, a large increase in the fraction of eligible buyers, and
expectations that productivity in the consumption sector would rise quickly in the
future. These patterns reversed in the subsequent housing bust, as the fraction of
eligible buyers fell and agents became more pessimistic about future productivity.
Furthermore, the anticipated improvements to productivity turned out not to be
realized over the period of the housing bust.
2.2 Model
I consider an economy in which households value a perishable consumption good
and a durable housing good. Households invest the consumption good to create
two types of physical capital, consumption capital and housing capital. Two repre-
sentative, perfectly competitive firms rent capital and employ labor to produce the
consumption and housing goods. Trade in the consumption good occurs on a fric-
tionless spot market, but trade in the housing good is subject to search and matching
frictions.
2.2.1 Households
Following Merz (1995), I assume there is a measure-one continuum of households,
each comprising a ‘large family’ with a continuum of members. The members of the
family pool income and consumption, but live in different dwellings2. Figure 2.3 illus-
trates the household structure graphically. At any given time some members of the
household are satisfied with their dwelling, while others are dissatisfied. Household i
2This assumption is equivalent to assuming a complete markets allocation.
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where x is a preference parameters that governs the household’s relative taste for
consumption and housing, ρ is a parameter that governs the households distaste
for labor, Cit is household i’s consumption in period t, Nit is the fraction of family
members who live in a well-matched house in period t (‘Non-traders’), Eit is the
household’s search effort in period t, Bit is the fraction of family members who do
not live in a well-matched house in period t (‘Buyers’), and γt is the fraction of
Buyers who are able to search in a given period (‘Active Buyers’). λ is a parameter
governing the elasticity of substitution between consumption and housing, and μ is
the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. The basic idea of the households’ flow utility
function is that households value consumption and housing, but dislike labor and
expending effort searching for housing; the disutility from search effort is proportional
to the number of buyers but convex in the effort exerted per active buyer. There is
population growth in the model; variables marked with a ˜ have been divided by
the number of agents per household. In effect, the household’s preferences are over
per-agent variables rather than household totals.
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The household maximizes its utility subject to the constraints:








it − ICit − IHit +Πit
+ qtP
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KCit+1 = (1− δ)KCit + ICt −
χC
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KHit+1 = (1− δ)KHit + IHt −
χH
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Equation 2.2 is the household’s budget constraint. There are two types of capital in
the economy, consumption sector capital, KC , and housing sector capital, KH , which
command rental rates RC and RH respectively. The households hold the economy’s
productive capital stock directly; investment in consumption capital is denoted IC and
investment in housing capital is denoted IH . Π is profits from firms, which are owned
by the households. PW is the price at which the household buys newly built houses
(the ‘wholesale’ price) and Y H is the quantity of new houses purchased, so PWit Y
H
it is
the amount spent on newly built housing. PR is the price of already existing housing
(the ‘retail’ price), S is the number of existing houses the household markets for sale
(‘Sellers’), and q(θt, Et) is the probability that a seller will meet a buyer given θt,
the ratio of buyers to sellers in the housing market, and Et, the average search effort
expended by buyers. Later I will impose an assumption that a sale will occur any
time a buyer meets a seller, so that q(θt, Et)P
R
t Sit is the amount the household spends
on already existing housing. Finally, γtBit is the number of buyers the household has
on the market and f(θt, Et, Eit) is the probability that a buyer will meet a seller, so
f(θt, Et, Eit)P
R
t γtBit is the household’s proceeds from selling existing houses. Taken
together, equation 2.2 says that the household’s consumption in period t equals its
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wage income plus its capital income and proceeds from selling its stock of existing
houses, minus its investment, its spending on newly built houses, and its spending on
existing houses.
Equations 2.3 and 2.4 are the accumulation equations for capital in the consump-
tion and housing sectors. They feature quadratic costs of adjustment to the level of
the capital stock, the severity of which is parameterized by χC and χH .
The household also faces equations of motion for its numbers of buyers, houses
for sale, and satisfied homeowners. Because the equations of motion are specific to
the process for trade I assume in the housing market, I defer these equations to the
subsection describing the Housing Market. Therefore, I will also defer discussion of
the first order conditions (FOCs) of the household’s problem.
2.2.2 Firms
There are two perfectly competitive firms in the economy, one of which produces
the consumption good and one of which produces houses. Both firms rent capital
and hire labor from the households, and the construction firm also rents land from
the households. The consumption firm produces output according to the production
function:







where Y Ct is the production of the consumption good in period t, Z
C
t is total factor
productivity in the consumption sector in period t, KCt is the capital stock employed
in the consumption sector in period t, and LCt is the amount of labor employed in
the consumption sector in period t. The price of output in the consumption sector is
10







1−νC −RCt KCt −WtLCt (2.6)








Wt = (1− νC)ZCt (KCt )νC (LCt )−νC (2.8)
The housing firm produces houses according to the production function:







where Y Ht is the production of houses in period t, Z
H
t is total factor productivity in
the housing sector in period t, KHt is the capital stock employed in the housing sector
in period t, and LHt is the amount of labor employed in the housing sector in period
t. I assume labor is freely mobile, so that the wage is the same across sectors. The









ρH −RHt KHt −WtLHt (2.10)
where, as noted above, PW is the ‘wholesale’ price at which the housing firm sells






















In my calibration, I assume decreasing returns to scale in the housing sector. This as-
sumption is meant to capture the idea that land acts as a fixed factor in the production
of houses without explicitly modeling the details of land supply and demand. With
no trend growth in productivity in the housing sector, the assumption of decreasing
returns would lead to house prices steadily increasing with population. Therefore, I
assume that ZHt grows at rate (1 + g)
1−νH−ρH over time. This assumption implies
that the price of housing is constant on the balanced growth path.
2.2.3 The Housing Market
The housing market of this model exhibits search frictions. Buyers and sellers in
the market for well-matched houses cannot transact on a frictionless spot market but
instead form pairs according to a matching function that relates the numbers of active
buyers and sellers to the number of successful matches. I assume that when buyers
and sellers form a match, the seller’s house is always a good match for the buyer. The
implicit concept is that housing units and household preferences are heterogeneous,
so that many houses a buyer visits will be ill-suited to their taste. A “match” between
a buyer and a seller occurs when a buyer finds an appropriate house. The matching
function is a reduced form way to capture the time consuming nature of search and
matching in the housing market without specifying the microeconomic process by
which matches are formed.
I consider two different matching functions in the model. The first is the Cobb-
Douglas matching function that is standard in much of the literature (e.g., Wheaton
1990):
M(Et, γtBt, St) = A(EtγtBt)
φS1−φt (2.14)
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The second is the generalized urn-ball matching function of Head et al. (2010):
M(Et, γtBt, St) = ASt(1− e−ζ
EtγtBt
St ) (2.15)
whereM is the number of matches in a period. As is standard, I denote the ‘tightness’





For convenience, I define the probability that a buyer exerting effort Eit meets a seller
in a given period as










(1− e−Etθtζ) w/ urn-ball matching
(2.17)
At the cost of anticipating the equilibrium concept, in a symmetric equilibrium, in
which all households choose the same search effort, Eit = Et, the probability that a
buyer will meet a seller will be
f(θt, Et) = f(θt, Et, Et) =










(1− e−Etθtζ) w/ urn-ball matching
(2.18)









A(1− e−Etθtζ) w/ urn-ball matching
(2.19)
13
In the remainder of the text, I will suppress the dependence of f and q on their
arguments for simplicity.
In the model, individuals remain in their current house so long as it remains
‘well-matched’, but each period well-matched homeowners face probability α of be-
coming mismatched. Once an individual becomes mismatched, the parent household
no longer receives any utility from owning the house. Therefore, the parent house-
hold immediately puts the house for sale, and the individual begins looking for a
new house to purchase. An individual who becomes mismatched therefore becomes
simultaneously a seller and a potential buyer of housing. I assume that individuals
who do not own a well-matched house live with other members of their household.
The population of each household grows each period at rate g, with the new members
being born as poorly-matched households. Finally, I assume that only a fraction γt
of poorly matched individuals are able to search for a home each period. Implicitly,
one could imagine financing or other constraints that prevent some households from
searching in a given period.
The timing of each period is as follows:
1. Period starts.
2. Aggregate shocks realized.
3. Household receives flow utility from satisfied homeowners.
4. Housing market occurs
Matches formed
Bargaining and sales occur
5. Relocation shock hits
6. Production of goods and new houses
7. Housing company sells homeowners ‘unmatched’ new houses
8. Capital depreciates
9. Factors are paid and consumption occurs
10. New agents born
11. Period ends
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Because matching is costly and time consuming, there is a surplus value associated
with each match, which I will define in the section on Price Determination. I assume
that buyers and sellers always exploit potential gains from trade, so that every match
results in the sale of a house.
These assumptions give rise to the equations of motion for buyers (Bt), houses for
sale (St), and non-traders (Nt):








Sit+1 = (1− qit)Sit + α(Nit + fitγtBit)︸ ︷︷ ︸
agents hit by move
shock
+Y Hit−2 (2.21)
Nit+1 = (1− α)(Nit + fitγtBit) (2.22)
The first equation says that the number of buyers next period equals the number this
period, less the buyers who purchase a house and do not receive a relocation shock,
plus non-traders who receive a relocation shock and new agents. The second equation
says that the number of homes for sale next period equals the number this period
minus those sold, plus the homes for sale posted by newly mis-matched homeowners
and new construction from two periods ago. The lag of two periods represents a
time to build in the construction sector of approximately three quarters. The third
equation says that the number of satisfied homeowners equals the number from last
period, less those hit by a relocation shock, plus the number of buyers who successfully
purchase a well-matched home.
15
2.2.4 Recursive Formulation of the Household’s Problem
Given this structure for trade in the housing market, the household’s problem
can be re-formulated as a recursive problem with the following Bellman equation,
where I have detrended the budget constraint and equations of motion to adjust for
population growth:




















V (B̃it+1, S̃it+1, Ñit+1, K̃Cit+1, K̃Hit+1)
]}
s.t.








it − ĨCit − ĨHit +Πit
+ qtP
R
it S̃it − PWt ˜Y Hit − fitPRit γtB̃it
K̃Cit+1 = (1− δ)K̃Cit + ĨCit
K̃Hit+1 = (1− δ)K̃Hit + ĨHit
(1 + g)B̃it+1 = B̃it − (1− α)fitγtB̃it + αÑit + g
(1 + g)S̃it+1 = (1− qt)S̃it + α(Ñit + fitγtB̃it) + ˜Y Hit−2
(1 + g)Ñit+1 = (1− α)(Ñit + fitγtB̃it)
For convenience, I define the marginal values to the household of having an addi-
tional buyer (V B), seller (V S), and non-trader (V N):
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V Bit+1 + αfitγtV
S
it+1 + (1− α)fitγtV Nit+1
]
(2.23)
V Sit = UC̃,itP
R
















α(V Bit+1 + V
S
it+1) + (1− α)V Nit+1
]
(2.25)
where UC̃,it denotes the marginal utility of consumption and UÑ,it denotes the
marginal flow utility of a well-matched house in period t. The household’s Bellman




it , Eit, and L̃it. The FOCs
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Equations (2.26) and (2.27) are the household’s Euler equations for consumption
and housing capital, and reflect the quadratic costs of adjustment to both capital
stocks. Equation (2.28) states that the wholesale price at which the household pur-
chases unmatched houses from the construction firm, times the marginal utility of
consumption, equals the discounted value of having an additional house for sale in
three quarters. Equation (2.29) specifies the household’s optimal search effort, at
which the marginal disutility of additional search equals the marginal improvement
in the probability of forming a match times the buyer’s surplus from forming a match.
In a symmetric equilibrium in which all households choose the same search effort,

























(1− α)(V Nt+1 − V Bt+1) + αV St+1
])
(2.32)
in the case of urn-ball matching.
2.2.5 Price Determination
The buyer’s surplus from purchasing a house at price PRt is the difference in utility
from buying the house versus continuing to search, less the price of the house in utility
terms:





(1− α)V Nt+1 + αV St+1 − V Bt+1
]− UC̃,itPRt (2.33)
For the seller, selling a house at price PRt gives a payoff in utility terms of UC̃,itP
R
t ,







. The seller’s surplus is the difference:










The match surplus is the total surplus to both parties from completing the trans-
action rather than parting ways, so it is the sum of the buyer’s surplus and the seller’s
surplus:





(1− α)(V Nt+1 − V Bt+1) + α(V St+1 − V Bt+1)− V St+1
]
(2.35)
The purchase price of the house divides the match surplus between the buyer and
the seller. I will denote the share of the match surplus accruing to the buyer as
ηt. Setting the buyer’s surplus equal to ηt times the total match surplus gives the
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Traditionally in the housing search and matching literature, it is assumed that the
buyer receives a fixed share of the match surplus: ηt = η. This sharing rule for the
surplus is motivated as the result of an asymmetric Nash bargain between the buyer
and seller. I will call the model with this sharing rule the “random search” model.
More recently, Diaz and Jerez (2009) and Head et al. (2010) have explored search
and matching models of the housing market under the competitive search framework
introduced by Moen (1997) in the context of labor search. In the competitive search
environment, sellers post list prices for their houses, and can credibly commit not
to bargain with buyers over the price after a match forms. Moen shows that in a
competitive search equilibrium, the share of the match surplus going to each party
equals the elasticity of the matching function with respect to that party’s side of the
market. In such an environment, when the housing market “heats up”, so that there
are more buyers relative to sellers, the share of the match surplus going to the sellers
will rise, while when the market “cools down”, the share of the match surplus going
to buyers will rise. Therefore, the competitive search framework has the potential to
add volatility to house prices relative to the random search framework, in which the
share of the match surplus accruing to the buyer remains constant.
Diaz and Jerez and Head et al. show that in the housing market, a competitive
search equilibrium can be implemented similarly to a standard search equilibrium by
adding an equation to endogenize ηt, the share of the match surplus going to the
buyer, to be equal to the elasticity of the matching function with respect to buyers
20







With a Cobb-Douglas matching function, the elasticity of the matching function
with respect to both sides of the market is constant. In this case, the competitive
search model is equivalent to the random search model if the buyer’s share of the
match surplus is equal to the elasticity of the matching function with respect to
buyers, i.e. if η = φ. This equality, known as the Hosios condition after Hosios
(1990), is a necessary condition for efficiency in the random search model. Therefore,
as in much of the literature, I impose this condition in my calibration, implying that
the two methods of determining the sharing rule are equivalent with the Cobb-Douglas
matching function.
To allow the competitive search model to generate different results than the ran-
dom search model, I follow Diaz and Jerez and Head et al. in using the urn-ball
matching function described above. In this case, which I will call the “competitive
search” model, the buyer’s share of the match surplus equals the elasticity of the








eEtθtζ − 1 (2.38)
2.2.6 Sources of Stochastic Variation
I include four aggregate shocks in the model: anticipated and unanticipated shocks
to productivity in the consumption sector, an unanticipated shock to productivity in
the housing sector, and an unanticipated shock to the fraction of buyers who are
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eligible to search. I assume ZCt , Z
H
t , and γt follow the AR(1) processes:
ln(ZCt ) = ψC ln(Z
C
t−1) + (1− ψC) ln(ZC) + εCt + εAt−20 (2.39)
εCt ∼ N(0, σ2C) (2.40)
εAt ∼ N(0, σ2A) (2.41)
ln(ZHt ) = ψH ln(Z
H
t−1) + (1− ψH) ln(ZH) + εHt (2.42)
εHt ∼ N(0, σ2H) (2.43)
ln(γt) = ψγ ln(γt−1) + (1− ψγ) ln(γ) + εγt (2.44)
εγt ∼ N(0, σ2γ) (2.45)
where bars above variables represent their steady state values. I assume the shocks
are independently distributed.
I will call the shock εAt an anticipation shock, as it represents an anticipated
movement in the future level of consumption productivity. Because I take the model
period to be one quarter, anticipation shocks concern productivity changes 5 years in
the future. These anticipation shocks are on average “correct” in the sense that the
actual technology level in the housing sector equals the anticipated level in expecta-
tion. However, the presence of a contemporaneous or unanticipated shock to housing
technology allows me to study the case of an unrealized expectation of a change in
future productivity, which would correspond to εCt being exactly equal to −εAt−20. This
scenario is in the spirit of Beaudry and Portier’s (2004) “Pigou Cycles”.
2.2.7 Equilibrium
I define an equilibrium of the model as follows:
Definition A symmetric recursive search equilibrium of this model is a set of policy
functions for the households and firms, equations of motion for the stocks of capital,
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buyers, sellers, and non-traders, and prices for factors of production, new houses, and
existing houses, such that:
1. Households maximize their utility taking factor prices and the price of new
houses as given;
2. Firms maximize their profits taking all prices as given;
3. The consumption good, new housing, and factor markets clear;
4. Every household chooses the same search effort;
5. The number of sales in of existing houses is consistent with the matching func-
tion; and
6. The price of existing houses is determined according to the appropriate sharing
rule.
Please see Appendix 2.6.1 for a complete list of equations characterizing equilib-
rium both in the random search model and in the competitive search model.
2.3 Empirics
2.3.1 State Space Representation
The model above can be linearized around its steady state equilibrium to give the
following state space representation:
Zt = Z(Θ) +B(Θ)Zt−1 +G(Θ)et (2.46)
Yt = HZt (2.47)
E[ete
′
t] = V(Θ) (2.48)
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In the transition equation, (2.46), Θ is a vector of the structural parameters of the
model, Z(Θ) is a vector of the steady state values of the model variables (which are
functions of Θ), and Zt is a vector of the deviations of the model variables from their
steady state values. B(Θ) is a system matrix that relates this period’s deviations
from steady state to last period’s. Finally, G(Θ) is a policy function matrix and et
is the vector of structural shocks to the economy.
In the observation equation, (2.47), Yt is a vector of the observable variables I will
use to estimate the model. H is a matrix of ones and zeros that selects the variables
to be observed. In equation (2.48), V(Θ) is the variance-covariance matrix of the
shock process; I impose that the shocks are i.i.d., so V(Θ) is a diagonal matrix.
Together, equations (2.46) and (2.47) form a system of Kalman filter equations. I
use the Kalman filter recursions to evaluate the log-likelihood of the model conditional
on the structural parameters Θ and the observed data series Yt.
2.3.2 Observed Data Series
I use GDP, the price of existing homes, sales volumes, and starts as my observable
data series. Because I have four shocks in the model, using four observable data series
allows me to avoid using observation errors in the observation equation (2.47). The
model makes different predictions for how these series will react to each of the four
shocks in the model, so using these series in the estimation should allow for successful
identification of the parameters of the shock process and the historical shocks.
I use the following procedure to match the data series I am using as closely as
possible to the conceptual variables in my model. For all variables that are available
on a monthly basis, I take simple averages to construct quarterly values. Next I
convert all nominal variables to 2010 dollars using the CPI-U. Because the unit of
analysis in my model is the household, I construct the GDP, Sales, and Starts series on
a per household basis. To calculate the number of households, I divide the quarterly
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total population, which I construct as the average of the monthly population over the
quarter, by the average household size provided by the Census. Average household
size is only provided annually, so I use a cubic spline to interpolate quarterly values.
I then take logs of each series and regress the log values on a linear time trend, and
for the not seasonally adjusted series, a set of quarter dummies. Finally I add the
deviations from the linear time trend to the average value for each series over the
sample period, 1982q3-2010q4.
The house price series I use is the CoreLogic Single Family Detached House Price
Index (HPI). Because the CoreLogic HPI is not expressed in dollar terms, I normalize
it to $194,592, the value of the FHFA U.S. single family detached HPI, in 2000q1.
For my sales volume series, I take the sum of new single family houses sold from the
Census Bureau and existing single family houses sold from the National Association
of Realtors (NAR). Using the total of new and existing home sales is conceptually
appropriate because in the model, all new houses are immediately sold on a frictionless
spot market to the households, who then market them for sale on the frictional housing
market along with previously built homes. For my starts series, I use single family
starts from the Census. I take the GDP series from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
The resulting series are shown in Figures 2.1 and 2.2.3
2.3.3 Calibrated Parameters and Steady State
I calibrate the parameters that determine the steady state of the model, which is
equivalent to imposing a degenerate prior distribution for their values in the estima-
tion procedure. Table 2.2 shows the calibrated parameters. I take the model period
to be one quarter. The only parameters that differ between the random and compet-
3Figure 2.2 shows two additional series that I do not use in the estimation procedure, months’
supply and the vacancy rate. For my months’ supply series, I add the inventory of existing single
family homes published by the NAR to the number of newly constructed homes for sale published
by the Census, and divide by the sum of existing single family home sales reported by the NAR and
new single family houses sold reported by the Census. For the vacancy rate, I use the homeowners’
vacancy rate from the Census Bureau’s Housing Vacancy Survey.
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itive search models concern the matching function and disutility of search effort. For
these parameters, I calibrate the random search model to have the same steady state
values for the buyer’s share of the match surplus, η, search effort, E, and months’
supply of housing as the random search model.
I also impose unit roots in the technology shocks in the model. I have experimented
with estimating the persistence of these shocks; the results do not change appreciably.
I also calibrate the level of capital adjustment costs in both sectors, χC and χH , to
be zero4.
One key parameter that affects the model results is the elasticity of substitution
between housing and the consumption good in the utility function. Unfortunately,
there is not a consensus in the literature regarding the value of this parameter. Typi-
cally, cross-sectional studies such as Rappaport (2008), find values for this parameter
of approximately 0.5. In contrast, time series studies such as Rupert et al. (1995)
typically find values of 1 or greater. I calibrate the elasticity of substitution to be 0.5
in my baseline case, but I discuss briefly how the results differ when the elasticity is
set to 1 in the Analysis section.
Some key steady state values implied by these parameters are described in Table
2.3. Some steady state values bear discussion because they deviate from values in the
data. The steady state proportion of the labor force, LH , is too low at 1.6%. This
is chiefly because I calibrate my model using only single family home construction,
whereas the set of all construction workers includes those working in multi-family and
non-residential construction. Similarly, the number of sales per household is 1.1% per
quarter. This implies an unrealistically long period between moves. This discrepancy
results from the exclusion of multi-family dwellings from the sales figures I use to
calibrate the model, as well as the absence of renters from the model.




I use the random walk Metropolis Hastings Algorithm to estimate the standard
deviations of the shocks and the persistence of the eligible buyers shock. Table 2.4
displays the prior distributions I specify for these parameters.
I run the sampler for 40,000 iterations and drop the first 45% before conducting
posterior simulations. Figure 2.4 illustrates the prior (in gray) and posterior (in
black) distributions for each of the parameters to be estimated. The posterior means
and standard deviations of the estimated parameters are listed in Table 2.5, and are
illustrated in Figure 2.4. The posterior distributions for most parameters are similar
for the random and competitive search models. In both models, the parameters are
tightly identified by the estimation procedure. Furthermore, the priors I specify do
not appear to constrain the posterior distributions I obtain.
The Laplace approximation of the log marginal density is 745.7 for the competitive
search model and 715.5 for the random search model. According to DeJong and
Dave, the implied posterior odds ratio constitutes “decisive evidence” in favor of the
competitive search model.
2.4.2 Impulse Responses
I linearize the system of equations around the steady state to find impulse re-
sponses to the shocks in the model. Figures 2.5 through 2.8 show the impulse response
functions for each of the shocks, which are normalized to be one standard deviation
in size. The plotted values in all impulse responses are proportional deviations from
the variable’s steady state (i.e. a value of 0.01 is a 1% deviation from the steady state
value). The time period covered is 240 quarters.
In response to an anticipated increase in consumption productivity, GDP falls
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slightly on impact while construction and prices rise and sales rise a bit. When the
shock is realized, construction falls sharply and GDP rises5. Prices remain at their
new, higher level after the productivity level rises, while construction falls sharply as
the cost of producing housing relative to the consumption good jumps. Construction
levels eventually settle at very slightly above their original steady state levels.
In response to an unanticipated consumption productivity shock, GDP, prices,
and sales all rise on impact. Construction exhibits a hump-shaped response, while
months’ supply initially falls before rising above its steady state level.
The random and competitive search models respond differently to the eligible
buyers shock. In both cases sales rise sharply on impact and the market becomes
much tighter, as represented by lower months’ supply. In the random search model
the fixed sharing rule for dividing the match surplus mutes the effect on prices, and
therefore on construction. In the competitive search model, the tighter market gives
the sellers greater bargaining power and a greater share of the match surplus, so the
rise in prices is much more pronounced. The higher prices cause construction to rise
sharply as well. Again, GDP is essentially flat in response to the shock.
In response to a housing productivity shock, GDP rises by a small amount, con-
struction rises and house prices fall. Sales and months’ supply both rise. The impulse
responses are quite similar between the random and competitive search models.
2.4.3 Estimated Shocks
Figures 2.9 and 2.10 illustrates the smoothed shocks from the estimation procedure
for the competitive and random search models. Here, I will focus on the shocks from
the competitive search model. Several patterns in emerge from the figure. First,
there were a series of positive shocks to anticipated consumption productivity in
the early 2000s. From 2001q1 to 2004q4, the anticipated productivity shock was
5The technology shocks in the model have a unit root, so the shocks will generally have permanent
effects.
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positive in all quarters but one, for a cumulative increase of 41%. In the ensuing years
this pattern reverses sharply, with overwhelmingly negative shocks to anticipated
consumption productivity. Furthermore, in the period 2006q1-2009q4, a series of
negative shocks to unanticipated productivity almost perfectly counteracts the earlier
positive shocks to anticipated productivity (in fact, the cumulative size of these shocks
is -48%, larger than the positive productivity shocks). There is also a large series
of positive shocks to the fraction of eligible buyers beginning in the mid-1990s and
intensifying in the 2000s, which reverses sharply in 2007. Finally, a number of negative
shocks to housing productivity in the 2000s contributed to rising prices during the
housing boom. Figure 2.11 illustrates the historical decomposition of the change in
house prices over the sample period into the changes due to each shock, while table
2.6 displays the conditional variance decomposition of the four series used in the
estimation procedure at two time horizons, 4 quarters and 40 quarters.
The anticipated shocks to consumption productivity during the housing boom are
quite large. However, when I set the elasticity of substitution between housing and
the consumption good to one, to reflect Cobb-Douglas utility, the estimated anticipa-
tion shocks become even larger, around 70 percent in the boom period. Furthermore,
reducing the Frisch elasticity of labor supply to one-quarter from one does not reduce
the size of the estimated anticipation shocks substantially. While there are many in-
terpretations of the large size of the estimated anticipation shocks during the housing
boom, my preferred interpretation is that the mechanisms that generate variation in
house prices in this paper omit important aspects of reality. Specifically, I believe
the estimation results suggest that unwarranted optimism regarding future market
conditions on the part of participants in the housing market was an important part
of the recent housing boom and bust.
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2.4.4 Simulations
Because the model features unit root shocks, I use Monte Carlo simulations to
assess the model’s dynamic behavior. Tables 2.7 and 2.8 show the results of simulat-
ing the competitive and random search models using the mean estimated parameter
values. For each model, I simulate 114 quarters of data (the same number as in my
observed sample) 500 times. The tables show the same statistics for the simulated
data that Table 2.1 shows for the actual data. Therefore, comparison with Table 2.1
should help in evaluating the model’s empirical performance.
Qualitatively, the model is able to generate most of the observed correlations
between key housing market variables. Prices, sales, and starts are positively corre-
lated, and prices are comove positively with GDP. Starts are negatively correlated
with months’ supply and the vacancy rate. However, there is a slight negative cor-
relation between starts and GDP, contrary to what is observed in the data. The
competitive search model does a better job matching the observed correlations than
the random search model, although neither model is able to match the strength of
the observed correlations between prices, sales, and starts quantitatively.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper presents a search and matching model of the housing market embedded
in a DSGE framework. Conditional on the observed data, a model with competitive
search is more likely than a model with random search and bargaining. The model
reproduces many of the stylized facts of the housing market, most notably the positive
co-movement of prices, sales, and starts, and the negative co-movement of starts and
months’ supply. The estimation results imply that the recent housing boom was
driven by a large increase in the fraction of eligible buyers and anticipated increases
in future productivity in the consumption sector, while the ensuing bust was caused
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by a sharp reversal of these trends in conjunction with a series of unanticipated
negative shocks to consumption productivity. I interpret this pattern as suggesting
that the housing boom and bust were driven in part by expectations of above trend
productivity growth that later turned out to be unfounded; however, the large size of
these shocks during the housing boom suggests a role for irrational or unwarranted
optimism on the part of housing market participants in this period.
2.6 Appendix
2.6.1 Equilibrium Equations
The following system of equations characterizes a recursive Nash equilibrium of
this model (the i subscripts have been dropped because households are identical):














(1 + g)B̃t+1 = Bt − (1− α)f(θt, Et)γtB̃t + αÑt (2.51)
(1 + g)S̃t+1 = (1− q(θt, Et))S̃t + α(Ñt + f(θt, Et)γtB̃t) + Ỹ Ht−2 (2.52)



























































(1− α)(V Nt+1 − V Bt+1) + αV St+1
])
(2.57)













t+1 + (1− α)f(θ, Et)γtV Nt+1
]
(2.58)
V St = UC̃,tP
R













(αV Bit + (1− α)V Nt+1
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(2.60)





























































f(θ, Et, Eit) = AEit(Etθt)
φ−1 (2.70)
q(θt, Et) = A(Etθt)
φ (2.71)

















ln(Z̃Ht ) = ψH ln(Z̃
H
t−1) + (1− ψH) ln(ZH) + εHt (2.75)
ln(ZCt ) = ψC ln(Z
C
t−1) + (1− ψC) ln(ZC) + εCt + εAt−20 (2.76)
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ln(γt) = ψγ ln(γt−1) + (1− ψγ) ln(γ) + εγt (2.77)
˜GDP t = Ỹ
C
t + P





GDPobs,t = ln(GDP ) (2.80)
TOMobs,t = ln(3TOMt) (2.81)
PRobs,t = ln(PRt) (2.82)

















As in Iacoviello and Neri (2010) and Lambertini et al. (2010), I calculate GDP
using the steady state price of housing. In the last six equations, I calculate the
simulated data series in logs, which is how they are expressed in my estimation pro-
cedure, Figures 2.1 and 2.2, and Tables 2.1, 2.8, and 2.7. Note that I equate time
on the market with months’ supply in the data; I multiply the model’s time on the
market by 3 because the model period is quarterly, not monthly. Finally, I equate
St, the number of sellers, with the homeowner vacancy rate from the Census Housing
Vacancy Survey, whereas in reality many homes for sale remain occupied.
In the competitive search model, I replace equations 2.68, 2.70, 2.71, and 2.57 with
the following equations, respectively (the only change in the price setting equation is
that the buyer’s share of the match surplus, η, is time varying):




















(1− α)(V Nt+1 − V Bt+1) + αV St+1
])
(2.92)
I also add an equation for the determination of the buyer’s share of the match surplus:
ηt =
Etθtζ
eEtθtζ − 1 (2.93)
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Table 2.1: Housing Market Time Series
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Table 2.2: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Symbol Value Reason
Competitive Search Model
Discount Factor β 0.995 0.98 annually
Depreciation Rate of Productive Capi-
tal
δ 0.026 0.1 annually
Relocation Probability α .009 Home sales per household ≈ .0114
Population Growth Rate g .0026 Starts per household ≈ .0027
SS Consumption Productivity ZC 324.9 Quarterly GDP ≈ $27,092
SS Housing Productivity ZH 0.0059 House Price ≈ $200,750
CES Utility Parameter λ -1 Elasticity of Substitution = 12
Preference for housing vs. consumption x 0.99998 Quarterly Consumption ≈17,950
Frisch Elasticity of Labor Supply μ 1 Standard Value
Disutility of Labor ρ 1005 Labor Supply = 1
SS fraction of eligible buyers γ 0.7 θ ≈ 0.7
Efficiency of Matching Function A 1.31 Months’ Supply ≈ 7 months
Disutility of Search Effort σ 24608 Finding Rate ≈ .6
Capital’s Share in Consumption Pro-
duction Function
νC .35 Standard Value
Capital’s Share in Housing Production
Function
νH .19 Albouy and Ehrlich 2011
Labor’s Share in Housing Production
Function
ρH .56 Albouy and Ehrlich 2011
Persistence of Consumption Productiv-
ity Shock
ψC 1 Unit Root Technology Shock
Persistence of Housing Productivity
Shock
ψC 1 Unit Root Technology Shock
Consumption Capital Adjustment
Costs
χC 0 Might drop this parameter
Housing Capital Adjustment Costs χH 0 Might drop this parameter
Urn-ball Generalization Parameter ζ 1.08 Steady State η = 0.81
Random Search Model (where dif-
ferent)
Efficiency of Matching Function A 1 Months’ Supply ≈ 7
Buyers’ Exponent in Matching Func-
tion
φ .79 Genesove and Han 2010
Disutility of Search Effort σ 24610 Finding Rate ≈ .6
Buyer’s Share of Match Surplus η .81 Hosios Condition
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Table 2.3: Steady State Values
Variable Symbol Value
Total Labor Supply L 1
Proportion of Labor Force in Housing LH 0.016
Wholesale Housing Price PW $194,323
Retail Housing Price PR $200,750
Number of Eligible Buyers γB 0.019
Houses for Sale S 0.026
Market Tightness θ 0.74
Probability of Sale q(E, θ) 0.443
Probability of Purchase f(E, θ) 0.598
Search Effort E 0.517
Months’ Supply TOM 6.77
Sales M(E, θ, γ) 0.011
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Table 2.4: Prior Distributions for Estimated Parameters
Variable Symbol Distribution
Persistence of Eligible Buyers Shock ψγ Uniform(0.001,0.999)
Standard Error of Anticipated Con-
sumption Productivity Shock
σA Uniform(0,0.1)
Standard Error of Unanticipated Con-
sumption Productivity Shock
σC Uniform(0, 0.1)
Standard Error of Eligible Buyers
Shock
σγ Uniform(0, 0.5)




Table 2.5: Posterior Values for Estimated Parameters
Variable Symbol Posterior Mean (S.D.) Posterior Mean (S.D.)
Competitive Search Random Search
Persistence of Eligible Buyers Shock ψγ 0.9945 (0.0032) 0.9669 (0.0098)
Standard Error of Anticipated Con-
sumption Productivity Shock
σA 0.0264 (0.0019) 0.0321 (0.0022)
Standard Error of Unanticipated Con-
sumption Productivity Shock
σC 0.0259 (0.0019) 0.0319 (0.0021)
Standard Error of Eligible Buyers
Shock
σγ 0.2027 (0.0137) 0.1721 (0.0108)
Standard Error of Housing Productiv-
ity Shock
σH 0.0192 (0.0013) 0.0177 (0.0013)
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Table 2.6: Conditional Variance Decomposition - Competitive Search Model








Prices 0.03 0.51 0.05 0.41
Starts 0.36 0.01 0.48 0.15
Sales 0.00 0.02 0.98 0.00
GDP 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
40 quarter horizon
Prices 0.17 0.53 0.01 0.29
Starts 0.64 0.15 0.17 0.04
Sales 0.03 0.05 0.92 0.00
GDP 0.18 0.82 0.00 0.00
Table shows the proportion of each series’ variance accounted for by each shock at the specified
horizons.
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Table 2.8: Simulations of Random Search Model
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Figure 2.1: Housing Market Time Series 1983q1-2010q4
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Series are seasonally adjusted log values from 1982q3-2010q4, expressed as deviations
from linear trend plus average value over sample period. Shaded areas are NBER
recession dates. Please see Observed Data Series section for details on series con-
struction.
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Figure 2.2: Housing Market Time Series 1983q1-2010q4 (cont’d.)
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Series are seasonally adjusted log values from 1982q3-2010q4, expressed as deviations
from linear trend plus average value over sample period. Shaded areas are NBER
recession dates. Please see Observed Data Series section for details on series con-
struction.
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Figure 2.4: Priors and Posteriors for Estimated Parameters













































Posteriors obtained from random walk Metropolis Hastings Algorithm.
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Figure 2.5: Impulse Responses to an Anticipated Consumption Productivity Shock
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Time period is quarterly. Values shown are log deviations from steady state values.
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Figure 2.6: Impulse Responses to an Unanticipated Consumption Productivity Shock
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Time period is quarterly. Values shown are log deviations from steady state values.
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Figure 2.7: Impulse Responses to an Eligible Buyers Shock















































Time period is quarterly. Values shown are log deviations from steady state values.
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Figure 2.8: Impulse Responses to an Unanticipated Housing Productivity Shock












































Time period is quarterly. Values shown are log deviations from steady state values.
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Figure 2.9: Smoothed Shocks - Competitive Search Model














































Figure 2.10: Smoothed Shocks - Random Search Model














































Figure 2.11: Historical Decomposition - Competitive Search Model
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Metropolitan Land Values and Housing
Productivity1
3.1 Introduction
Households spend more on housing than any other good, and the value of housing
depends fundamentally on the land upon which it is built. Land values can vary
tremendously, reflecting the scarcity of the many heterogeneous amenities and labor-
market opportunities to which land provides access. They also reflect opportunities
for development, as land that cannot be built on generally has little private value.
Land values are quite possibly the most fundamental prices examined in spatial and
urban economics.
Accurate data on land values have been notoriously piecemeal, although data
on housing values are widespread. Housing values can differ considerably from land
values, partly because of the labor and material costs of producing housing structures.
The topographical nature of a land parcel’s terrain can also influence the quantities
of inputs needed to produce housing structures. Restrictions and regulations on
land use can raise expensive barriers to building, which can lower the efficiency with
which housing services are provided to occupants, creating what is often referred
1This chapter was co-authored with David Albouy.
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to as a “regulatory tax.” While these regulations may be costly, they could also
provide benefits to local residents by promoting positive neighborhood externalities,
or curtailing negative ones. Whether land-use regulations are welfare improving is
perhaps the most hotly debated issue in the microeconomics of housing.
Here, we provide the first inter-metropolitan index of directly-observed land values
that covers a large number of American metropolitan areas, using recent data from
CoStar, a commercial real estate company. This index varies far more than a similarly
constructed index of housing values; the two indices are strongly but imperfectly
correlated, with potentially informative deviations. We use duality methods (Fuss
and McFadden 1978) to estimate the cost relationship between housing output and
input prices using these land and housing-value indices, together with indices on non-
land input prices and other measures. This supply-side approach to valuing housing
strongly complements the demand-side approach to studying housing prices, based
on housing’s proximity to local amenities and labor-market opportunities.
Our analysis provides a new measure of local productivity in the housing sector,
which we infer from the difference between the observed price of housing and the cost
predicted by land and other input prices. This productivity metric is a summary indi-
cator of how efficiently housing inputs are transformed into valuable housing services
within a metropolitan area. It is also a novel indicator of local productivity in sectors
that produce goods not traded across cities. This measure may be contrasted with
measures of productivity in tradeables sectors, such as in Beeson and Eberts (1989)
and Albouy (2009). Using recent measures by Gyourko, Saiz, and Summers (2008)
and Saiz (2010), we investigate how local housing productivity is influenced by natural
and artificial constraints to development arising from geography and regulation.
We find that, on average, approximately one-third of housing costs are due to
land: this share ranges from 11 to 48 percent in low to high-value areas, implying
an elasticity of substitution between land and other inputs of about 0.5 in our base-
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line specification. Consistent estimation of these parameters requires controlling for
regulatory and geographic constraints: a standard deviation increase in aggregate
measures of these constraints is associated with 8 to 9 percent higher housing costs.
We also examine disaggregated measures of regulation and geography and find that
approval delays, supply restrictions, local political pressure, and state court involve-
ment predict the lowest productivity levels, although our estimates are imprecise.
Overall, housing productivity differences across metro areas are large, with a stan-
dard deviation equal to 23 percent of total costs, with 22 percent of the variance
explained by observed regulations. Contrary to assumptions in the literature (e.g.
Shapiro 2006 and Rappaport 2007) that productivity in tradeables and housing are
the same, we find the two are negatively correlated. For example, the San Fran-
cisco Bay Area is extremely efficient in tradeable industries, and extremely inefficient
in producing housing, largely because of its regulations and geography. In general,
we find housing productivity to be decreasing, rather than increasing, in city size,
suggesting that there are urban diseconomies of scale in housing production. Addi-
tionally, we find that lower housing productivity associated with land-use regulation
is correlated with a higher quality of life, suggesting that households may value the
neighborhood effects these regulations promote. However, the welfare costs of lower
housing productivity appear to outweigh these benefits.
Our transaction-based measure differs from common measures of land values based
on the difference between a property’s entire value and the estimated value of its
structure only. Davis and Palumbo (2007) employ this “residual” method successfully
across metro areas, although as the authors note, “using several formulas, different
sources of data, and a few assumptions about unobserved quantities, none of which is
likely to be exactly right.” Moreover, the residual method attributes higher costs due
to inefficiencies in factor usage – possibly from geographic and regulatory constraints
– to higher land values. This may explain why Davis and Palumbo often find higher
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costs shares of land than we do.2
A number of studies have examined data on both housing and land values. Rose
(1992) acquires data across 27 cities in Japan and finds greater geographic land avail-
ability is associated with lower land and housing values. Ihlanfeldt (2007) takes
measures of assessed land values from tax rolls in 25 Florida counties, and finds that
land-use regulations are associated with higher housing prices but lower land values.
Glaeser and Gyourko (2003) use an augmented residual method to compare hous-
ing and inferred land values across the United States, and find that the two differ
most in heavily regulated environments. Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saks (2005b) find
that the price of units in Manhattan multi-story buildings exceeds the marginal cost
of producing them, attributing the difference to regulation. They find the cost of
this regulatory tax is larger than the externality benefits they consider, mainly from
preserving views.3
The econometric approach we use differs in that it explicitly incorporates a cost
function, which models land as a variable input to housing production. This approach
has similarities to Epple, Gordon, and Sieg (2010), who use separately assessed land
and structure values for houses in Alleghany County, PA, and find land’s cost share
to be 14 percent. We focus on variation across, rather than within cities, which allows
us to identify the cost structure from variation in construction prices, geography, and
a wide array of regulations. Unlike Epple et al. and Thorsnes (1997), who uses data
from Portland, our estimated elasticity of substitution between land and non-land
inputs is less than one, which is consistent with much of the older literature – see
McDonald (1981) for a survey – based on within-city variation in housing values.
2Although hedonic methods can theoretically provide estimates of land values from housing val-
ues, these estimates can be questioned. Using an augmented residual method based on hedonics,
Glaeser and Ward (2009) estimate a value of $16,000 per acre of land in the Greater Boston area,
while presenting evidence that the market price of an acre is approximately $300,000 if new housing
can be built on it. They attribute this discrepancy to zoning regulations.
3Other works of note that consider the relationship between land-use regulations, land values,
and housing values include Ohls et al. (1974), Courant (1976), and Katz and Rosen (1987).
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Three recent papers also make use of the CoStar COMPS data to construct land-
value indices. Haughwout, Orr, and Bedoll (2008) construct a land price index for the
period 1999-2006 within the New York metro area, documenting many sales within
the densest areas of Manhattan, as well as in outlying areas. Kok, Monkkonen, and
Quigley (2010) also document land sales throughout the San Francisco Bay Area, and
relate the sales prices to the topographical, demographic, and regulatory features of
the site. Nichols, Oliner, and Mulhall (2010) construct a panel of land-value indices
for 23 metro areas from the 1990s through 2009. They demonstrate that land values
vary more across time than housing values, much as our analysis demonstrates is true
across space.
Section 3.2 presents our cost-function approach for modeling housing prices and
relates it to an econometric model. It also provides a general-equilibrium model for
the full determination of land values. Section 3.3 discusses our data and explains how
we use them to construct indices of land values, housing prices, construction prices,
geography, and regulation across metro areas. Section 3.4 presents our estimates of the
housing-cost function and how housing productivity is influenced by geographic and
regulatory constraints. Section 3.5 considers how housing productivity varies across
cities and is related to measures of urban productivity in tradeables and quality of
life.
3.2 Model of Land Values and Housing Production
Our econometric model uses a cost function for housing production within a
system-of-cities model, proposed by Roback (1982), and developed by Albouy (2009).
The national economy contains many cities indexed by j, which produce a numeraire
good, X, traded across cities, and housing, Y , which is not traded across cities, and




3.2.1 Cost Function for Housing
We begin with a two-factor model in which firms produce housing, Yj, using land
L and materials M according to the production function
Yj = F
Y (L,M ;AYj ), (3.1)
where F Yj is concave and exhibits constant returns to scale (CRS) in L and M at the
firm level. Housing productivity, AYj , is a city-level characteristic that may be fixed
or determined endogenously by city characteristics, such as population size. Land
is paid a city-specific price, rj, while materials are paid price vj. In our empirical
work, we operationalize M as the installed structure component of housing, so vj
is conceptualized as an index of construction input prices, possibly an aggregate of
local labor and mobile capital. Unit costs in the housing sector, equal to marginal
and average costs, are cY (rj, vj;A
Y
j ) ≡ minL,M{rjL+ vjM : FY (L,M ;AYj ) = 1}.
The use of a single function to model the production of a heterogeneous housing
stock is well established in the literature, beginning with Muth (1960) and Olsen
(1969). In the words of Epple et al. (2010, p. 906)
The production function for housing entails a powerful abstraction.
Houses are viewed as differing only in the quantity of services they pro-
vide, with housing services being homogeneous and divisible. Thus, a
grand house and a modest house differ only in the number of homoge-
neous service units they contain.
This abstraction also implies that a highly capital-intensive form of housing, e.g., an
apartment building, can substitute in consumption for a highly land-intensive form
of housing, e.g., single-story detached houses.4
4Our analysis uses data from owner-occupied properties, accounting for 67% of homes, of which
82% are single-family and detached.
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Assuming the housing market in city j is perfectly competitive5, then in equilib-
rium housing price equals the unit cost in cities with positive production:
cY (rj, vj;A
Y
j ) = pj. (3.2)
Our methodology of estimating housing productivity is illustrated in figure 3.1 panel
A, holding vj constant. The thick solid curve represents the cost function of housing
for cities with average productivity. As land values rise from Denver to New York,
housing prices rise, albeit at a diminishing rate, as housing producers substitute away
from land as a factor input. The higher, thinner curve represents the cost function for
a city with lower productivity, such as San Francisco. The lower productivity level is
identified by how much higher the housing price in San Francisco is relative to a city
with the same factor costs, such as in New York.
The first-order log-linear approximation of equation (3.2) around the national
average expresses how housing prices should vary with input prices and productivity,
p̂j = φ
Lr̂j + (1− φL)v̂j − ÂYj . ẑj represents, for any z, city j’s log deviation from the
national average, z̄, i.e. ẑj = ln zj− ln z. φL is the cost share of land in housing at the
average, and AjY is normalized so that a one-point increase in Â
Y
j corresponds to a
one-point reduction in log costs.6 Rearranged, this equation infers home-productivity
from how high land and material costs are relative to housing costs:
ÂjY = φ
Lr̂j + (1− φL)v̂j − p̂j. (3.3)
5Although this assumption may seem stringent, the empirical evidence is consistent with perfect
competition in the construction sector. Considering evidence from the 1997 Economic Census,
Glaeser et al. (2005b) report that “...all the available evidence suggests that the housing production
industry is highly competitive.” Basu et al. (2006) calculate returns to scale in the construction
industry (average cost divided by marginal cost) as 1.00, indicating firms in the construction industry
having no market power. This seems sensible as new homes must compete with the stock of existing
homes. If markets are imperfectly competitive, then AYj will vary inversely with the mark-up on
housing prices above marginal costs.
6This requires that productivity at the national average obeys ĀY = −p̄/[∂cY (r̄, m̄, ĀY )/∂A].
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If housing productivity is factor neutral, i.e., F Y (L,M ;AYj ) = A
Y
j F
Y (L,M ; 1),
then the second-order log-linear approximation of (3.2), drawn in figure 3.1 panel B,
is
p̂j = φ
Lr̂j + (1− φL)v̂j + 1
2
φL(1− φL)(1− σY )(r̂j − v̂j)2 − ÂYj , (3.4)
where σY is the elasticity of substitution between land and non-land inputs. This
elasticity of substitution is less than one if costs increase in the square of the factor-
price difference, (r̂j − v̂j)2. The actual cost share is not constant across cities, but is
approximated by
φLj = φ
L + φL(1− φL)(1− σY )(r̂j − v̂j), (3.5)
and thus is increasing with r̂j − v̂j when σY < 1. Our estimates of ÂYj assume that
a single elasticity of substitution describes production in all cities. If this elasticity
varies, then our estimates will conflate a lower elasticity with lower productivity. This
is seen in figure 3.1 panels A and B, which compare σY = 1 in the solid curves, with
σY = 1 in the dashed curves. When production has low substitutability, the cost
curve is flatter, as housing does not use less land in higher-value cities. This has the
same observable consequence of increasing housing prices, although theoretically the
concepts are different.7
If housing productivity is not factor neutral, then as derived in Appendix 3.7.1,
equation (3.4) contains additional terms to account for the productivity of land rela-
tive to materials, AY Lj /A
YM
j :
−φL(1− φL)(1− σY )(r̂j − v̂j)(ÂY Lj − ÂYMj ). (3.6)
If σY < 1, then cities where land is expensive relative to materials, i.e., r̂j > v̂j, see
7Housing supply, as a quantity, is less responsive to price increases when substitutability is low,
rather than when productivity is low. While it would be desirable to distinguish the two, this would
be significantly more challenging and require much additional data, and so we leave it for future
work.
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greater cost reductions where the relative productivity level, AY Lj /A
YM
j , is higher.
3.2.2 Econometric Model
As a starting point, we estimate housing prices using an unrestricted translog cost
function (Christensen et al. 1973) in terms of land and non-land factor prices:
p̂j = β1r̂j + β2v̂j + β3(r̂j)
2 + β4(v̂j)
2 + β5(r̂j v̂j) + Z
jγ + εj, (3.7)
where Zj is a vector of city-level observable attributes that may affect housing prices.
This specification is equivalent to the second-order approximation of the cost function
(see, e.g., Binswager 1974, Fuss and McFadden 1978) under the restrictions imposed
by CRS
β1 = 1− β2, β3 = β4 = −β5/2, (3.8)
where φL = β1 and, with factor-neutral productivity, σ
Y = 1 − 2β3/ [β1(1− β1)].
Housing productivity is determined by attributes in Zj and unobservable attributes
in the residual, εj:
ÂjY = Z
j(−γ) + Âj0Y , Âj0Y = −εj. (3.9)
The second-order approximation of the cost function (i.e. the translog) is not a
constant-elasticity form. Hence, the elasticity of substitution we estimate is evaluated
at the sample mean parameter values (see Griliches and Ringstad 1971). The assump-
tion of Cobb-Douglas (CD) production technology imposes the restriction σY = 1,
which in equation (3.7) amounts to the three restrictions:
β3 = β4 = β5 = 0. (3.10)
Without additional data, non-neutral productivity differences are impossible to
detect unless we know what may shift AY Lj /A
YM
j . In the context, it seems reasonable
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to interact productivity shifters Zj with the difference in input prices (r̂j− ν̂j) in
equation (3.7). The reduced-form model allowing for non-neutral productivity shifts,
imposing the CRS restrictions may be written as:








j (r̂j − v̂j)+ εj (3.11)
As shown in Appendix 3.7.1, γ2Z
j/2β3 = (Â
YM
j − ÂY Lj ) − (ÂYM0j − ÂY L0j ) identifies
observable differences in factor-biased technical differences. If σY < 1, then γ2 > 0
implies that the shifter Z lowers the productivity of land relative to the non-land
input.8
3.2.3 Full Determination of Land Values
In this section, we determine land values and local-wage levels in a model of
location demand based on amenities to households, bundled as quality of life, Qj, and
to firms in the tradeable sector, bundled as trade productivity, AXj . Casual readers
may skip this section without loss of intuition. We posit two types of mobile workers,
k = X, Y , where type-Y workers work in the housing sector. Preferences are modeled
by the utility function Uk(x, y;Qkj ), which is quasi-concave over consumption x and
y, and increases in Qkj , which may vary by type. The household expenditure function
is ek(p, u;Q) ≡ minx,y{x + py : Uk (x, y;Q) ≥ u}. Each household supplies a single
unit of labor and is paid wkj,, which with non-labor income, I, makes up total income
mkj = w
k
j + I, out of which federal taxes, τ(m
k
j ), are paid. We assume households are
mobile and that both types occupy each city. Equilibrium requires that households
receive the same utility in all cities, so that higher prices or lower quality-of-life must
be compensated with greater after-tax income, ek(pj, ū
k;Qkj ) = m
k
j−τ(mkj ), k = X, Y,
where ūk is the level of utility attained nationally by type k. Log-linearizing this
8In equation (3.11), non-neutral productivity implies β1 = φL + β3(Â
YM
0j − ÂY L0j ) and εj =
−[φLÂY Lj + (1− φL)ÂYMj ] + (1/2)φL(1− φL)(1− σY )(ÂY Lj − ÂYMj )2
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condition around the national average
Q̂kj = s
k
y p̂j − (1− τ k)skwŵkj , k = X, Y. (3.12)
Qkj is normalized Q̂
k
j is equivalent to a one-percent drop in total consumption, s
k
y is the
average expenditure share on housing, and τ k is the average marginal tax rate, and
skw is the share of income from labor. Define the aggregate quality-of-life differential
Q̂j ≡ μXQ̂Xj + μY Q̂Yj , where μk is the share of income earned by type k households,
and let sy ≡ μXsXy + μY sYy , and (1− τ) swŵ ≡ μX(1− τX)sXw ŵXj + μY (1− τY )sYwŵYj .
Unlike housing output, tradeable output has a uniform price across all cities, and
is produced through the CRS and CD function, Xj = F
X(LX , NX , KX ;AXj ), where
NX is labor andKX is mobile capital, which also has the uniform price, i, everywhere.
We also assume that land commands the same price, rj, within a city in all sectors.
A derivation similar to the one for (3.3) yields the measure of tradeable productivity:
ÂXj = θ
Lr̂j + θ
N ŵXj , (3.13)
where θLand θN are the average cost-shares of land and labor in the tradeable sector.
To complete the model, let non-land inputs be produced through the CRS and
CD function Mj = (N
Y )a(KY )1−a, which implies v̂j = aŵYj , where a is the cost-share
of labor in non-land inputs. Defining φN = a(1 − φL), we can derive an alternative
measure of housing productivity based on wages:
ÂYj = φ
Lr̂j + φ
N ŵYj − p̂j. (3.14)
Combining the productivity in both sectors, the total-productivity differential of a
city is
Âj ≡ sxÂXj + syÂYj , (3.15)
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where sx is the average expenditure share on tradeables.
Combining the first-order approximation equations (3.12), (3.13), (3.14), and
(3.15), we get that the land-value differential times the average income share of land,
sR = sxθL + syφL, equals the total productivity differential plus the quality-of-life





j + Q̂j − τswŵj. (3.16)
In other words, land fully capitalizes the value of local amenities minus federal tax
payments.
Proper identification of the model requires that the observed determinants of
land values, r̂j, ŵj, and Zj are uncorrelated with unobserved determinants of A
Y
j in
the residual, εj. To some extent, this is inevitable if the vector of characteristics
Zj is incomplete and Â
Y 0
j = −εj = 0, as r̂j is determined by ÂYj in (3.16). We
have considered modeling the simultaneous determination of r̂j by Â
Y 0
j , but this
requires knowing the covariance structure between ÂXj ,Â
Y
j , and Q̂j. A more promising
approach is to find instrumental variables (IVs) that influence ÂXj or Q̂
j but are
unrelated to ÂYj . Below, we consider two instruments for land and non-land input
prices that we think are plausible, although certainly not unassailable. The first is
the inverse distance to the nearest salt-water coast. The second is average winter
temperature. We find the IV estimates are consistent with, but less precise than, our
ordinary least square (OLS) results, and thus focus on the latter. The geographic
constraints are predetermined, so we treat them as exogenous. We have not found a
plausible strong instrument for regulatory constraints.
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3.3 Data and Metropolitan Indicators
3.3.1 Land Values
We calculate our land-value index from transactions prices reported in the CoStar
COMPS database. The CoStar Group provides commercial real estate information
and claims to have the industry’s largest research organization, with researchers mak-
ing over 10,000 calls a day to commercial real estate professionals. The COMPS
database includes transaction details for all types of commercial real estate, including
what they term “land.” In this study, we take every land sale in the COMPS database
provided by CoStar University, which is provided for free to academic researchers.
Our sample includes transactions that occurred between 2005 and 2010 in a
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA).9 It excludes all transactions CoStar has marked
as non-arms length or without complete information for lot size, sales price, county,
and date, or that appear to feature a structure. Finally, we drop observations we
could not geocode successfully, leaving us with 68,757 observed land sales.10
CoStar provides a field describing the “proposed use” of each property, useful for
our analysis. We use 12 of the most common categories of “proposed use,”which are
neither mutually exclusive nor collectively exhaustive. Properties can have multiple
proposed uses or none at all. Thus, we also use an indicator for no proposed use.
The median price per acre in our sample is $272,838, while the mean is $1,536,374;
the median lot size is 3.5 acres while the mean is 26.4. Land sales occur more fre-
quently in the beginning of our sample period, with 21.7% of our sample from 2005,
9We use the June 30, 1999 definitions provided by the Office of Management and Budget. The
data are organized by Primary Metropolitan Statistical Areas (PMSAs) within larger Consolidated
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (CMSAs).
10We consider an observation to feature a structure when the transaction record includes the fields
for “Bldg Type”, “Year Built”, “Age”, or the phrase “Business Value Included” in the field “Sale
Conditions.” We geocoded using the Stata module “geocode” described in Ozimek and Miles (2011).
In addition, we drop outlier observations that we calculate as farther than 75 miles from the city
center or that have a predicted density greater than 50,000 housing units per square mile using the
weighting scheme described below. We also exclude outlier observations with a listed price of less
than $100 per acre or a lot size over 5,000 acres.
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and 11.4% from 2010. The frequencies of proposed uses are reported in table 3.1:
17.6% is for residential, including 10.7% is for single-family homes, 3.3% for multi-
family; and 3.6% for apartments; industrial, office, retail, medical, parking, and com-
mercial uses together account for 24.1%. 23.4% is being held for development or
investment, and 15.9% of the sample had no proposed use.
We calculate the metropolitan index of land values by regressing the log price per
acre of each sale, ln r̃ijt on a set of a vector of controls, Xijt, and a set of indicator
variables for each year-MSA interaction, ψjt in the equation ln r̃ijt = Xijtβ+ψjt+eijt.
In our regression tables we use land-value indices, r̂jt, based on estimates of ψjt by
year and MSA, normalized to have a national average of zero, weighting by number of
housing units; in our summary statistics and figures, we report land-value indices, r̂j,
aggregated across years. Furthermore, because of our limited sample size, land-value
indices derived from metro areas with fewer land sales may exhibit excess dispersion
because of sampling error. We correct for this using shrinkage methods described in
Kane and Staiger (2008), accounting for yearly as well as metropolitan variation in
the estimated ψ̂jt. The shrinkage effects are generally small, but do appear to correct
for mild amounts of attenuation bias in our subsequent analysis.
Table 3.1 reports the results for four successive land-value regressions. The first
regression has no controls. In column 2, we control for log lot size in acres, which
improves the R2 substantially from 0.30 to 0.70. The coefficient on lot size is -0.66,
illustrating the “plattage effect,” documented by Colwell and Sirmans (1980, 1993).
According to these authors, when there are costs to subdividing parcels (e.g. because
of zoning restrictions), large lots contain more land than is optimal for their intended
use, thus lowering their value per acre. Another possible explanation for this effect
is that large lots are located in less desirable areas. In column 3, we add controls
for intended use raising the R2 to 0.71. These intended uses help control for various
characteristics of the land parcels, although ultimately their inclusion has little impact
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on our land-value index.
The sample of land parcels in our data set is not a random sample of all lots, which
raises the concern of sample selection bias. As discussed in Nichols et al. (2010), it
is impossible to correct for this selection bias because we do not observe prices for
unsold lots.11 One especially relevant source of selection bias is that the geographic
distribution of sales may differ systematically from the overall distribution of land.
For instance, we may be more likely to observe land sales on the urban fringe, where
development activity is more intense. Such land will more closely reflect agricultural
land values, thus attenuating land-value differences across cities.
To handle sample selection, we re-weight our land observations to reflect the distri-
bution of housing units in the metro area. For each MSA, we pinpoint the metropoli-
tan center using Google Maps.12 Then, we regress the log number of housing units
per square mile at the census-tract level on the North-South and East-West distances
between the tract center and the city center, and the squares and product of these
distances. We calculate the predicted density of each observed land sale using the
city-specific coefficients from this regression, and use this predicted density in column
4, which we take as our preferred specification. The un-weighted and weighted indices
are highly correlated (the correlation coefficient is above 0.99), although the latter
are more dispersed, as predicted.
Because our focus is on residential housing, we were initially concerned about
using land sales with non-residential proposed uses. Ultimately, we find that indices
constructed only from land sales with a proposed residential use do not differ sys-
tematically from our preferred index, except that they are less precise. Nonetheless,
when we conduct our analysis below using residential-only indices, our chief results
are largely unaffected, although we lose some MSAs from our sample.
11There is a modest literature that attempts to control for selection bias in commercial real estate
and land prices, for example, Colwell and Munneke (1997), Fisher et al. (2007), and Munneke and
Slade (2000, 2001). Sample selection generally appears to be weak in this context.
12These centers are generally within a few blocks of the city hall of the MSA’s central city.
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Our preferred land-value index is based on the shrunken and weighted estimators
based on all land sales, as described above. To illustrate the impact of these choices,
figure 3.7 contrasts the differences between shrunken and unshrunken indices; figure
3.8, between weighted and un-weighted indices; and figure 3.9, between using all land
and land only for residential uses. While there are some differences between these
indices, their overall patterns are rather similar.
Land values for a selected group of metropolitan areas are reported in table 3.2,
together with averages by metropolitan population size. These values are very dis-
persed, with a weighted standard deviation of 0.76. The highest land values in the
sample are around New York City, San Francisco, and Los Angeles; the lowest are
in Saginaw, Utica, and Rochester, which has land values 1/35th those of New York
City. In general, large, coastal cities have the highest land values, while smaller cities
in the South and Midwest have lower values.
3.3.2 Housing Prices, Wages, and Construction Prices
We calculate housing-price and wage indices for each year from 2005 to 2010 using
the 1% samples from the American Community Survey. Our method, described in de-
tail in Appendix 3.7.2, mimics that for land values. For each year, we regress housing
prices of owner-occupied units on a set of indicators for each MSA, controlling flexi-
bly for observed housing characteristics, including age and type of building structure,
number of rooms and bedrooms interacted, and kitchen and plumbing facilities. The
coefficients on these metro indicators, normalized to have a weighted average of zero,
provide our index of housing prices, p̂jt, which we aggregate across years for display.
We estimate wage levels in a similar fashion, controlling for worker skills and
characteristics. We estimate indices for all workers, ŵj, and for the purpose of our
cost estimates, workers in the construction industry only, ŵYj . As seen in figure 3.10,
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ŵYj is similar to, but more dispersed than, overall wages, ŵj.
13
Our primary price index for construction inputs is calculated from the Building
Construction Cost data from the RS Means company, widely used in the literature,
e.g., Davis and Palumbo (2007), and Glaeser et al. (2005b). For each city in their
sample, RS Means reports construction costs for a composite of nine common struc-
ture types. The index reflects the costs of labor, materials, and equipment rental,
but not cost variations from regulatory restrictions, restrictive union practices, or
regional differences in building codes. We re-normalize this index as a z−score with
an average value of zero and a standard deviation of one across cities.14
The model of housing equilibrium requires that equation (3.2) be satisfied, so
that the replacement cost of a housing unit equals its market price. Because housing
is durable, this condition may not bind in cities where housing demand is so weak
that there is effectively no new supply (Glaeser and Gyourko 2005). In this case,
replacement costs will be above market prices, biasing the estimate of AYj upwards.
Technically, there is new housing supply in all of the MSAs in our sample, as measured
by building permits. However, we suspect that the equilibrium condition may not
bind throughout metro areas where population growth has been low. To indicate
MSAs with weak growth, we mark with an asterisk (∗), MSAs where the population
growth between 1980 and 2010 is in the lowest decile of our sample, weighted by
2010 population. These include metros such as Pittsburgh, Buffalo, and Detroit. In
Appendix 3.7.3, we find that the results are relatively unchanged when we exclude
these areas, although we report their estimates of housing productivity with caution.
The housing-price, construction-wage, and construction-cost indices, reported in
13We estimate wage levels at the CMSA level to account for commuting behavior across PMSAs.
14The RS Means index is based on cities as defined by three-digit zip code locations, and as such
there is not necessarily a one-to-one correspondence between metropolitan areas and RS Means
cities, but in most cases the correspondence is clear. If an MSA contains more than one RS Means
city we use the construction cost index of the city in the MSA that also has an entry in RS Means.
If a PMSA is separately defined in RS Means we use the cost index for that PMSA; otherwise we
use the cost index for the principal city of the parent CMSA. We only have 2010 edition of the RS
Means index.
70
columns 2, 3, and 4 of table 3.2, are strongly related to city size and positively
correlated with land values. They also exhibit considerably less dispersion. The
highest housing prices are in San Francisco, which are 9 times the lowest housing
prices, in McAllen, TX. The highest construction prices are in New York City, 1.9
times the lowest, in Rocky Mount, NC.
3.3.3 Regulatory and Geographic Constraints
Our index of regulatory constraints is provided by the Wharton Residential Land
Use Regulatory Index (WRLURI), described in Gyourko, Saiz, and Summers (2008).
The index is constructed from the survey responses of municipal planning officials re-
garding the regulatory process. These responses form the basis of 11 subindices, coded
so that higher scores correspond to greater regulatory stringency: the approval delay
index (ADI), the local political pressure index (LPPI), the state political involvement
index (SPII), the open space index (OSI), the exactions index (EI), the local project
approval index (LPAI), the local assembly index (LAI), the density restrictions index
(DRI), the supply restriction index (SRI), the state court involvement index (SCII),
and the local zoning approval index (LZAI). The authors construct a single aggregate
WRLURI index through factor analysis: we consider both the aggregate index and
the subindices in our analysis, each of which we r-enormalize as z−scores, with a
mean of zero and standard deviation one, as weighted by the housing units in our
sample. Typically, the WRLURI subindices are positively correlated, but not always;
for instance, the SCII is negatively correlated with five of the other subindices.
Our index of geographic constraints is provided by Saiz (2010), who uses satellite
imagery to calculate land scarcity in metropolitan areas. The index measures the
fraction of undevelopable land within a 50 km radius of the city center, where land
is undevelopable if it is i) covered by water or wetlands, or ii) has a slope of 15
degrees or steeper. While this land is not actually built on, it serves as a proxy for
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geographic features that may lower housing productivity. We consider both Saiz’s
aggregate index and his separate indices based on solid and flat land, each of which
is renormalized as a z−score.
According to the aggregate indices, reported in columns 5 and 6, the most regu-
lated land is in Boulder, CO, and the least regulated is in Glens Falls, NY; the most
geographically constrained is in Santa Barbara, CA, and the least is in Lubbock, TX.
3.4 Cost-Function Estimates
Below, we use the indices from section 3.3 to test and estimate the cost function
presented in section 3.2, and examine how it is influenced by geography and regulation
using both aggregated and disaggregated measures. We restrict our analysis to MSAs
with at least 10 land-sale observations, and years with at least 5. For our main
estimates, the MSAs must also have available WRLURI, Saiz and construction-price
indices, leaving 206 MSAs and 856 MSA-years.
3.4.1 Estimates and Tests of the Model
Figure 3.2 plots metropolitan housing prices against land values. The simple re-
gression line, weighted by the number of housing units in our sample, has a slope of
0.59; if there were no other cost or productivity differences across cities, this number
would estimate the cost share of land, φL, assuming CD production. The convex
curvature in the quadratic regression yields an imprecise estimate of the elasticity of
substitution of 0.18.15 Of course, this regression is biased, as land values are posi-
tively correlated with construction prices and geographic and regulatory constraints.
This figure illustrates how housing productivity is inferred by the vertical distance
between a marker and the regression line. Accordingly, San Francisco has low housing
15In levels, the cost curve must be weakly concave, but the log-linearized cost curve is convex if
σY < 1, although the convexity is limited as σY ≥ 0 implies β3 ≤ 0.5β1(1− β1).
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productivity and Las Vegas has high housing productivity.
To illustrate differences in construction prices, we plot them against land values
in figure 3.3. We use these data to estimate a cost surface shown in figure 3.4 without
controls. As in figure 3.2, cities with housing prices above this surface are inferred
to have lower housing productivity. Figure 3.3 plots the level curves for the surface
in 3B, which correspond to the zero-profit conditions (ZPCs) for housing producers,
seen in equation (3.4). These curves correspond to fixed sums of housing prices and
productivities, p̂j+Â
Y
j , with curves further to the upper-right corresponding to higher
sums. With the log-linearization, the slope of the ZPC is the ratio of land cost shares
to non-land cost shares, −φLj /(1 − φLj ). In the CD case, this slope is constant, as
illustrated by the solid line; with an elasticity, σY , of less than one, the slope of
the ZPC increases with land values, as the land-cost share rises with land prices, as
illustrated by the dashed curves.
Columns 1 and 2 of table 3.3 present cost-function estimates using the aggregate
geographic and regulatory indices, assuming CD production, as in (3.10); column
2 imposes the restriction of CRS in (3.8), which is barely rejected at the 5% level.
The CRS restriction is not rejected in the more flexible translog equation, presented
in columns 3 and 4. The restricted regression in column 4 estimates the elasticity
of substitution σY to be 0.37. While we cannot reject the CD restriction (3.10)
jointly with the CRS restriction (3.8), our interpretation of the evidence is that the
restricted translog equation in column 4 describes the data best and provides fairly
good evidence that σY is less than one.
The OLS estimates in columns 1 through 4 produce stable values of 0.37 for the
cost-share of land parameter, φL. Furthermore, we find that a one standard deviation
increase in the geographic and regulatory indices predict a 9- and 8-percent increase
in housing costs, respectively. These effects are consistent with our theory of housing
productivity and the belief that geographic and regulatory constraints impede the
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production of housing services.
Columns 5 and 6 present our IV estimates, which use inverse distance to a salt-
water coast and average winter temperature as instruments for the differentials (r̂− v̂)
and (r̂ − v̂)2. in the restricted equation (3.11) with γ2 = 0. Column 5 imposes
the CD restriction, β3 = 0 and only uses the coastal instrument. Estimates of the
first-stage, presented in table 3.8, reveal that these instruments are strong, with F -
statistics of 64 in column 5, and 15 and 17 in column 6. The IV estimates are
largely consistent with our OLS estimates, but less precise. The last row of table
3.3 reports the Chi-squared test of regressor endogeneity, in the spirit of Hausman
(1978): these tests do not reject the null of regressor exogeneity at any standard
size. The consistency of the IV estimates requires that distance-to-coast and winter
temperature are uncorrelated with housing productivity, conditional on measures of
geography and regulation. This assumption may be violated, as it may be difficult to
build housing in extreme temperatures. We believe our IVs are much more strongly
related to quality of life and trade productivity than to housing productivity, and
should produce mostly exogenous variation in land values, as expressed in (3.16).
The similarity of our OLS and IV estimates is reassuring and so we proceed under
the assumption that the OLS estimates are consistent.
We test the assumption that the productivity shifters are factor neutral in column
7. This allows γ2 to be non-zero in equation (3.11) by interacting the differential
(r̂− v̂) with the geographic and regulatory indices. This interaction does not produce
significant estimates of γ2 and does not change our other estimates significantly. While
this test of factor bias is imperfect, the evidence suggests that factor neutrality is not
strongly at odds with the data.
Finally, in column 8, we use an alternative measure of non-land input prices,
namely wage levels in the construction industry. The results in column 8 are quite
similar to those in column 4. We perform a number of additional robustness checks
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in table 3.9. We split the sample into two periods: a ”housing-boom” period, from
2005 to 2007, and a ”housing-bust” period, from 2008 to 2010. We also use alterna-
tive land-value indices, one using only residential land, a second not controlling for
proposed use or lot size, and another not shrinking the land-value index. The last
two robustness checks drop observations in our low-growth areas. The results of these
robustness checks, discussed in Appendix 3.7.3, reveal that the regression parameters
are surprisingly stable over these specifications.
3.4.2 Disaggregating the Regulatory and Geographic Indices
As discussed above, the WRLURI regulatory index aggregates 11 subindices, while
the Saiz index aggregates two. The factor loading of each of the WRLURI subindices
in the aggregate index is reported in column 1 of table 3.4, ordered according to its
factor load. Alongside, in column 2, are coefficient estimates from a regression of the
aggregate WRLURI z−score on the z−scores for the subindices. These coefficients
differ slightly from the factor loads because of differences in samples and weights.
Column 3 presents similar estimates for the Saiz subindices. The coefficients on these
measures are negative because the subindices indicate land that may be available for
development.
The specification in column 4 is identical to the specification in column 4 of table
3.3, but with the disaggregated regulatory and geographic subindices. The results
indicate that approval delays, local political pressure, state political involvement,
supply restrictions, and state court involvement are all associated with economically
significant reductions in housing productivity, ranging between 3- to 7- percent for
a one-standard deviation increase. All five subindices are statistically significant
at the 10-percent level, although only the last three are significant at 5 percent:
these tests may lack precision because of the high degree of correlation between the
subindices. None of the subindices has a significantly negative coefficient. The first
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three subindices are roughly consistent with the factor loading; the last two, for supply
restrictions and state court involvement, appear to be of greater importance than a
single-factor model captures.
Both of the Saiz subindices have statistically and economically significant negative
coefficients. The estimates imply that a one standard-deviation increase in the share
of flat or solid land is associated with a 7- to 9-percent reduction in housing costs.
Overall, the results of these regressions are encouraging. The estimated cost share
of land and the elasticity of substitution between land and other inputs into housing
production in our regressions are quite plausible, and the coefficients on the regulatory
and geographic variables have the predicted signs and reasonable magnitudes. The
tight fit of the cost-function specification, as measured by the R2 values approaching
90 percent, implies that even our imperfect measures of input prices and observable
constraints explain the variation in housing prices across metro areas quite well.
As our favored specification, we take the one from column 4 of table 3.4 – with
CRS, factor-neutrality, non-unitary σY , and disaggregated subindices – and use it for
our subsequent analysis. It provides a value of φL = 0.33 and σ
Y = 0.49. Using
formula (3.5), this implies that the cost share of land ranges from 11 percent in
Rochester to 48 percent in New York City.
3.5 Housing Productivity across Metropolitan Areas
3.5.1 Productivity in Housing and Tradeables
In column 1 of table 3.5 we list our inferred measures of housing productivity from
the favored specification, using both observed and unobserved components of housing
productivity, i.e., ÂYj = Zj(−γ̂)− ε̂j; column 2 reports only the value of productivity
predicted by the regulatory subindices, ZRj , i.e., Â
Y R
j = −γ̂R1 ZRj . The cities with the
most and least productive housing sectors are McAllen, TX and San Luis Obispo,
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CA. Among large metros, with over one million inhabitants the top five, excluding
our low-growth sample, are Houston, Indianapolis, Kansas City, Fort Worth, and
Columbus; the bottom five are San Francisco, San Jose Oakland, Los Angeles, and
Orange County, all on California’s coast. Along the East Coast, Bergen-Passaic and
Boston are notably unproductive. Cities with average productivity include Phoenix,
Chicago, and Miami. Somewhat surprisingly, New York City is in this group. Al-
though work by Glaeser et al. (2005b) suggests this is not true of Manhattan, the New
York PMSA includes all five boroughs and Westchester county, and houses nearly 10
million people.16
In addition, we provide estimates of trade productivity ÂXj and quality-of-life Q̂j
in columns 3 and 4, using formulas (3.13) and (3.12), calibrated with parameter values
taken from Albouy (2009).17 Housing productivity is plotted against trade productiv-
ity in figure 3.5. This figure draws level curves for total productivity averaged across
the housing and tradeables sectors, weighted by their expenditure shares, according
to formula (3.15).18
Our estimates of trade-productivity, based primarily on overall wage levels, are
largely consistent with the previous literature.19 Interestingly, trade productivity and
16See Table 3.10 for the values of the major indices and measures for all of the MSAs in our
sample.
17These calibrated values are θL = 0.025, sw = 0.75, τ = 0.32, sx = 0.64. θ
N is set at 0.8 so that
it is consistent with sw. For the estimates of Q̂j , we account for price variation in both housing
and non-housing goods. We measure cost differences in housing goods using the expenditure-share
of housing, 0.18, times the housing-price differential p̂j . To account for non-housing goods, we
use the share of 0.18 times the predicted value of housing net of productivity differences, setting
ÂjY = 0, i.e., p̂j − ÂjY = φLr̂j + φN ŵj , the price of non-tradeable goods predicted by factor prices
alone. Furthermore, we subtract a sixth of housing-price costs to account for the tax-benefits of
owner-occupied housing. This procedure yields a cost-of-living index roughly consistent with that of
Albouy (2009). Our method of accounting for non-housing costs helps to avoid problems of division
bias in subsequent analysis, where we regress measures of quality of life, inferred from high housing
prices, with measures of housing productivity, inferred from low housing prices.
18The estimated productivities are positively related to the housing supply elasticities provided
by Saiz (2010): a 1-point increase in productivity predicts a 1.94-point (s.e. = 0.24) increase in the
supply elasticity (R2 = 0.41).
19Also shown in Figure 3.5 is a line which depicts the bias to trade productivity estimates if land
values are proxied with housing values, assuming housing productivities are uniform across cities
(see Albouy 2009). Cities along this line would be inferred to have the same trade productivity, as
cities with higher housing productivity have housing values low relative to land values, leading to
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housing productivity are negatively, rather than positively, correlated. According
to the regression line, a 1-point increase in trade-productivity predicts a 1.7-point
decrease in housing productivity. For instance, cities in the San Francisco Bay Area
have among the highest levels of trade productivity and the lowest levels of housing
productivity. On the other hand, Houston, Fort Worth, and Atlanta are relatively
more productive in housing than in tradeables. The large metro area with the greatest
overall productivity is New York; that with the least is Tucson.
The negative relationship between trade and housing productivity estimates may
stem from differing scale economies at the city level. While trade productivity is
known to increase with city size (e.g., Rosenthal and Strange, 2004), it is possible
that economies of scale in housing may be decreasing, possibly because of negative
externalities in production from congestion, regulation, or other sources. It may be
more difficult for producers to build new housing in already crowded environments,
such as on a lot surrounded by other structures. New construction may impose neg-
ative externalities in consumption on incumbent residents, e.g., by blocking views or
increasing traffic. Aware of this, residents may seek to constrain housing development
to limit these externalities through regulation, lowering housing productivity.
We explore this hypothesis in table 3.6, which examines the relationship of produc-
tivity with population levels, aggregated at the consolidated metropolitan (CMSA)
level, in panel A, or population density, in panel B. In column 1, the positive elas-
ticities of trade productivity with respect to population of roughly 6 percent are
consistent with those in the literature. The results in column 2 reveal negative elas-
ticities, nearly 8 percent in magnitude. According to the results in column 3, which
uses only the housing productivity component predicted by the regulatory subindices,
about half of this relationship results from greater regulation. Overall productivity,
examined in column 4, increases with population, but much more weakly than trade
lower inferred measures of trade productivity.
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productivity. The results in column 5 suggest that this relationship would be stronger
if the greater regulation associated with higher populations were held constant. As
we explore in the next section, holding the regulatory environment constant could
have negative consequences for urban quality of life.
3.5.2 Housing Productivity and Quality of Life
The model of section 3.2 predicts that if the sole effects of regulations were to
reduce housing productivity, then they would increase housing prices while reducing
land values, unambiguously reducing welfare (Albouy 2009). Ostensibly, the purpose
of land-use regulations is to raise housing values by ”recogniz[ing] local externalities,
providing amenities that make communities more attractive,” (Quigley and Rosenthal
2005) i.e., by raising demand, rather than by limiting supply, giving rise to terms such
as ”externality zoning.” To our knowledge, there are only a few, limited estimates of
the benefits of these regulations, e.g. Cheshire and Sheppard (2002) and Glaeser et
al. (2005b), both of which suggest that the welfare costs of regulation outweigh the
benefits.
To examine this hypothesis we relate our quality-of-life and housing-productivity
estimates, shown in figure 3.6. The regression line in this figure suggests that a one-
point decrease in housing productivity is associated with a 0.1-point increase in quality
of life. If we accept the relationship as causal, the net welfare benefit of this trade-off,
measured as a fraction of total consumption, equals this 0.1-point increase, minus the
one-point decrease multiplied by the expenditure share of housing, which we calibrate
as 0.18. Thus, a one-point decrease in housing productivity results in a net welfare
loss of 0.08-percent of consumption. These results help to rationalize the existence
of welfare-reducing regulations, if the benefits accrue to incumbent residents, who
control the political process, while the costs are borne by potential residents, who do
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not have a local political voice.20
We explore this relationship further in table 3.7, which controls for possible con-
founding factors and isolates housing productivity predicted by regulation. The odd
numbered columns include controls for natural amenities, such as climate, adjacency
to the coast, and the geographic constraint index; the even numbered columns add
controls for artificial amenities, such as the population level, density, education, crime
rates, and number of eating and drinking establishments. In columns 1 and 2, these
controls undo the relationship, as geographic amenities are related negatively to pro-
ductivity and positively to quality of life. When we focus on productivity predicted
by regulation, in columns 3 and 4, the original relationship is restored, although it
is slightly weaker. As before, if these results are interpreted causally, the impact of
land-use regulations is on net welfare-reducing.
Non-causal explanations for the relationship in table 3.7 are also plausible. For
instance, residents in areas with unobserved amenities may simply elect to regulate
land-use for reasons unrelated to urban quality of life. Alternatively, with prefer-
ence heterogeneity, the quality-of-life measure represents the willingness-to-pay of
the marginal resident. In cities with low-housing productivity, the supply of hous-
ing is effectively constrained, raising the willingness-to-pay of the marginal resident,
much as in the “Superstar City” hypothesis of Gyourko, Mayer, and Sinai (2006).
However, the negative relationship between productivity and quality of life appears
to hold for more than a small subset of superstar cities.
20The net welfare loss from regulations implies that land should lose value while housing gains
value. While property owners should in the long run seek to maximize the value of their land,
frictions, due to moving costs and the immobility of housing capital, may cause most owners to
maximize the value of their housing stock over their voting time horizons.
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3.6 Conclusion
Our novel index of land values seems to contain important information not cap-
tured by typical indices of housing prices. As theory would predict, the variation
of land values is greater than that of housing, and ultimately implies an average
cost share of land of approximately one-third. The housing-cost model performs sur-
prisingly well at explaining housing prices despite the disparate data sources. Our
empirical model is consistent with constant returns to scale at the firm level, with an
elasticity of substitution between land and non-land inputs of roughly one-half. This
implies that the cost of share land rises from as low as 11 percent in low-value areas
to 48 percent in high-value areas.
The housing-cost function modeled above provides the previously untested hy-
pothesis that geographic and regulatory constraints will increase the wedge between
the prices of housing and its inputs. The data strongly support this hypothesis and
may provide guidance as to which regulations have the greatest impact on housing
costs at the metropolitan level. Furthermore, our parsimonious model explains nearly
90 percent of the variation in metropolitan housing prices and our instrumental vari-
able estimates provide reassurance that our ordinary least squares estimates are likely
consistent. In general, the plausibility of the indices and the reasonableness of the
empirical results are mutually reinforcing.
The pattern of housing productivity across metropolitan areas is also illuminating.
Cities that are productive in tradeables sectors tend to be less productive in housing
as the two appear to subject to opposite economies of scale. Larger cities have
lower housing productivity, much of which seems attributable to greater regulation.
These regulatory costs are associated cross-sectionally with a higher quality of life
for residents, although this relationship is weak, suggesting that land-use regulations
lead to net welfare costs for the economy as a whole.
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3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 Factor-Specific Productivity Biases
When housing productivity is factor specific we may write the production function
for housing as Yj = F
Y (L,M ;AYj ) = F
Y (AY Lj L,A
YM
j M ; 1). The first-order log-linear
approximation of the production function around the national average is
p̂j = φ
Lr̂j + (1− φL)v̂j − [φLÂY Lj + (1− φL)ÂYMj ]
As both ÂY Lj and Â
YM
j are only in the residual, it is difficult to identify them sepa-
rately. The second-order log-linear approximation of the production function is
p̂j = φ
L(r̂j − ÂY Lj ) + (1− φL)(v̂j − ÂYMj ) + (1/2)φL(1− φL)(1− σY )(r̂j − ÂY Lj − v̂j + ÂYMj )2
(3.17)
= φLr̂j + (1− φL)v̂j + (1/2)φL(1− φL)(1− σY )(r̂j − v̂j)2
+ φL(1− φL)(1− σY )(r̂j − v̂j)(ÂYMj − ÂY Lj )
− [φLÂY Lj + (1− φL)ÂYMj ] + (1/2)φL(1− φL)(1− σY )(ÂY Lj − ÂYMj )2
The terms on the second-to-last line demonstrate that if σY < 1, then productiv-
ity improvements that affect land more will exhibit a negative interaction with the
rent variable and a positive interaction with the material price, while productivity
improvements that affect material use more, will exhibit the opposite. Therefore, if
a productivity shifter Zj, biases productivity so that (Â
YM
j − ÂY Lj ) = Zjζ,we may
identify factor-specific productivity biases with the following reduced-form equation:
p̂j = β1r̂j + β2v̂j + β3(r̂j)
2 + β4(v̂j)
2 + β5(r̂j v̂j) + γ1Zj + γ2Zj r̂j + γ3Zj v̂j + εj (3.18)
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The model embodied in (3.17) imposes the restriction that γ2 = −γ3 = ζφL(1 −
φL)(1− σY ).
3.7.2 Wage and Housing Price Indices
The wage and housing price indices are estimated from the 2005 to 2010 American
Community Survey, which samples 1% of the United States population every year.
The indices are estimated with separate regressions for each year. For the wage
regressions, we include all workers who live in an MSA and were employed in the
last year, and reported positive wage and salary income. We calculate hours worked
as average weekly hours times the midpoint of one of six bins for weeks worked in
the past year. We then divide wage and salary income for the year by our calculated
hours worked variable to find an hourly wage. We regress the log hourly wage on a set
of MSA dummies and a number of individual covariates, each of which is interacted
with gender:
• 12 indicators of educational attainment;
• a quartic in potential experience and potential experience interacted with years
of education;
• age and age squared;
• 9 indicators of industry at the one-digit level (1950 classification);
• 9 indicators of employment at the one-digit level (1950 classification);
• 5 indicators of marital status (married with spouse present, married with spouse
absent, divorced, widowed, separated);
• an indicator for veteran status, and veteran status interacted with age;
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• 5 indicators of minority status (Black, Hispanic, Asian, Native American, and
other);
• an indicator of immigrant status, years since immigration, and immigrant status
interacted with black, Hispanic, Asian, and other;
• 2 indicators for English proficiency (none or poor).
This regression is first run using census-person weights. From the regressions
a predicted wage is calculated using individual characteristics alone, controlling for
MSA, to form a new weight equal to the predicted wage times the census-person
weight. These new income-adjusted weights allow us to weight workers by their
income share. The new weights are then used in a second regression, which is used
to calculate the city-wage indices from the MSA indicator variables, renormalized to
have a national average of zero every year. In practice, this weighting procedure has
only a small effect on the estimated wage differentials. All of the wage regressions
are at the CMSA level rather than the PMSA level to reflect the ability of workers
to commute relatively easily to jobs throughout a CMSA.
To calculate construction wage differentials, we drop all non-construction workers
and follow the same procedure as above. We define the construction sector as occu-
pation codes 620 through 676 in the ACS 2000-2007 occupation codes. In our sample,
4.5% of all workers are in the construction sector.
The housing price index of an MSA is calculated in a manner similar to the
differential wage, by regressing housing prices on a set of covariates. The covariates
used in the regression for the adjusted housing cost differential are:
• survey year dummies;
• 9 indicators of building size;
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• 9 indicators for the number of rooms, 5 indicators for the number of bedrooms,
and number of rooms interacted with number of bedrooms;
• 3 indicators for lot size;
• 13 indicators for when the building was built;
• 2 indicators for complete plumbing and kitchen facilities;
• an indicator for commercial use;
• an indicator for condominium status (owned units only).
A regression of housing values on housing characteristics and MSA indicator vari-
ables is first run weighting by census-housing weights. A new value-adjusted weight
is calculated by multiplying the census-housing weights by the predicted value from
this first regression using housing characteristics alone, controlling for MSA. A second
regression is run using these new weights on the housing characteristics, along with
the MSA indicators. The housing-price indices are taken from the MSA indicator
variables in this second regression, renormalized to have a national average of zero
every year. As with the wage differentials, this adjusted weighting method has only a
small impact on the measured price differentials. In contrast to the wage regressions,
the housing price regressions were run at the PMSA level rather than the CMSA level
to achieve a better geographic match between the housing stock and the underlying
land.
3.7.3 Estimate Stability
We conduct several exercises in order to gauge the stability of our estimates;
the results of these exercises are reported in table 3.9. First, we split the sample
into two periods: a ”housing-boom” period, from 2005 to 2007, and a ”housing-
bust” period, from 2008 to 2010. As seen in columns 2 and 3, the regression results
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for the split samples are not statistically different from those in the pooled sample,
in column 1. Comparing the two split samples, the latter period does appear to
have a somewhat lower elasticity of substitution and weaker effects of geographic and
regulatory constraints. Whether this is a product of sampling error or secular changes
in housing production remains to be seen.
Second, we report results for the same regressions using three alternative land-
value indices: i) residential land values only, ii) “raw” land-value indices, iii) un-
shrunken land-value indices. Land is defined as residential if its proposed use is listed
as single-family, multi-family, or apartments. Raw land-value indices are procured
by regressing log price per acre on a set of MSA indicators without any additional
covariates, such as proposed use or lot size, and are not reweighted by location, cor-
responding to the regression in column 1 of table 3.1. The unshrunken indices are
derived directly from the regression in column 4 of table 3.1, without applying the
Kane and Staiger (2008) shrinkage technique. The results for the residential land
values in column 4 are nearly identical to those in column 1. In columns 5 and 6, the
estimated land share is lower as we see more dispersion in the land index, which ap-
pears to cause attenuation effects: the first, due to noise introduced by not controlling
for observable characteristics; the second, from sampling error.
The results in column 7 drop observations that we deemed to have low growth,
i.e. metro areas with population growth from 1980 to 2010 in the bottom decile.
The estimated cost share of land and the elasticity of substitution using this sample
is slightly lower, albeit not significantly. However, in a regression using our favored
specification, with all of the regulatory and geographic subindices, not shown, the
results are more similar. If, as in column 8, we instead define our low-growth sample
using the bottom decile of MSAs in terms of the building permits issued from 2005 to
2010 relative to the size of the housing stock, the results are quite close to our base
specification.
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Table 3.1: Land Value Index Regressions
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Table 3.7: Quality of Life and Housing Productivity
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Table 2.10: List of Metropolitan Indices Ranked by Land Price Differential, 2005-2010

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.10: List of Metropolitan Indices Ranked by Land Price Differential, 2005-2010
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Panel A: In Levels
Panel B: In Logarithms
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Figure 3.4: Three-Dimensional Cost Curve, corresponding to ZPC Curves in Figure
3.3, Estimated from Data, No Covariates
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Price and Time to Sale Dynamics in the Housing
Market: the Role of Incomplete Information
4.1 Introduction
It is a stylized fact of the market for existing homes that there is a strong positive
correlation between sales prices and sales volumes and there is a negative correlation
between sales prices and the average time houses take to sell. Figure 1 illustrates this
pattern using United States data from 1983q1 to 2010q4.1 The top panel shows the
log of the CoreLogic House Price Index for single family detached homes, the middle
panel illustrates log single family home sales per household, and the bottom panel
displays months’ supply of single family homes for sale (hereafter months’ supply).2
Since 2000, the correlation coefficient between prices and sales volumes has been 0.73
and the correlation coefficient between prices and months’ supply has been -0.34;
both correlations are statistically significant at the 5-percent level.3
1Sales volume and industry data are from the National Association of Realtors and price data is
from CoreLogic.
2Months’ supply is the ratio of the number of homes listed as being for sale at the end of the
month divided by the number of sales that month. It is used as a proxy for the average time on
market because nationally representative data for time on market is unavailable. All series have had
a linear time trend removed, and prices were deflated using the CPI.
3The correlation between prices and sales volumes remains strong over the entire sampling period,
but the correlation between prices and months’ supply becomes much weaker. However, studies at
the city level, such as Genesove and Mayer (2001) and Miller and Sklarz (1986), find the same
relationship between prices and time on market.
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Although direct data on the time it takes houses to sell (hereafter time on market
or time to sale) is not available at a national level, studies on the city level find a
similar pattern when considering time on market directly. For instance, Genesove
and Mayer (2001) document that in the Boston condominium market, fewer than 30
percent of listed units sold within 180 days during the trough year of 1992, while
in 1997, after the market had recovered, more than 60 percent of new listings sold
within 180 days. Miller and Sklarz (1986) document similar trends in Hawaii and
Salt Lake City. Regarding the correlation between prices sales volumes, Stein (1995)
shows that between 1986 and 1992, a 10 percent drop in prices reduces sales volumes
by approximately 1.6 million units in a time span with average volume of three to
four million units. Ortalo-Magne and Rady (1998) show the same qualitative pattern
holds in the U.K. The robustness of this pattern leads Genesove and Mayer (1997) to
describe it as “one of the most distinctive and puzzling macro features of the market
for existing homes.”
This paper offers a stylized model to explain this pattern in which home sellers
have incomplete information about conditions in the housing market. This assump-
tion seems natural in light of most households’ infrequent participation in the housing
market. Anily et al. (1999) report that the expected total time for a household to
reside in an owner-occupied unit is 13 years. Case and Shiller (2003) note the rela-
tive absence of professional traders in the housing market: “Buyers and sellers in the
housing market are overwhelmingly amateurs, who have little experience with trad-
ing. High transactions costs, moral hazard problems, and government subsidization of
owner-occupied homes have kept professional speculators out of the market.” There-
fore many sellers may begin the sales process with limited or outdated information
regarding conditions in the real estate market.
Another central assumption in the model is that sellers face idiosyncratic variation
in the offers they receive. Although in the model I present the offer distribution is
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exogenous, this variation may come from differences in the match quality between
the potential buyer and the house, variations in buyers’ eagerness to transact quickly,
or other factors. Although there is limited data concerning the distributions of of-
fers sellers receive, Merlo and Ortalo-Magne (2004) present evidence both that offer
amounts vary within a negotiation between a buyer and a seller, and that later bid-
ders for a house tend to make higher bids than earlier bidders. The existence of
idiosyncratic variation in offers seems well-accepted in the theoretical literature. For
instance, Haurin discusses the optimal decision rule for sellers facing particular offer
distributions.
Finally, the model considers the interaction between sellers with incomplete in-
formation and real estate agents with complete information. Recent research by
Levitt and Syverson (2002,2008) has shown that because realtors’ typical compensa-
tion structure leads to misalignment between realtors’ and sellers’ incentives, realtors
may not be able to convey their knowledge of the real estate market to sellers effi-
ciently. They show that empirically, realtors seem to encourage their clients to sell
their homes more quickly than would be optimal for a fully informed seller. The model
demonstrates that in such an environment, expected time to sale remains negatively
correlated with house prices even in the presence of fully informed realtors.
I construct a measure of homeowner misperceptions of housing market conditions
using data from the American Community Survey and use it to test one of the model’s
key predictions. I find that elevated misperceptions of house prices are associated
with lower sales volumes at both the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) and state
levels. A simple fixed effects regression of sales volumes on the misperceptions index
explains 21% of the variation in sales at the MSA level and 24% at the state level.
Furthermore, I show that variation in the misperceptions index is related to volatility
in prices and measures of heterogeneity in the housing stock.
A substantial literature attempts to explain the stylized fact. Magnus (2010) and
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Ehrlich (2012) show that the strong correlations between prices, sales, and time on
market are difficult to replicate in a general equilibrium search and matching model of
the housing market. Stein (1995) models the role of downpayment requirements and
credit constraints in generating these correlations, which Genesove and Mayer (1997)
document empirically. Genesove and Mayer (2001) argue that prospect theory can
explain the correlations if sellers use the price they paid for their house as a reference
point to evaluate offers. They provide evidence that this reference point influences
seller behavior. Albrecht et al. (2007) model a process in which sellers become more
anxious to sell the longer the sales process takes, and therefore accept lower offers
when a house has sat on the market for a long time. Finally, Lazear (2010) argues
that consistent with the theory of monopoly pricing, sellers find it optimal to accept
a lower probability of sale when demand, and therefore prices, fall.
The model in the present paper departs from the previous literature in assuming
that sellers have imperfect information regarding the state of the housing market. It
demonstrates that relaxing the assumption of perfect information can generate the
observed patterns in the data, even when some agents in the model do have full
information. I show that empirically, homeowners’ misperceptions regarding housing
values are correlated with changes in sales volumes, with an elasticity of sales with
respect to misperceptions is about 1.7 in my baseline specification.
4.2 The Model
The model I consider is a partial equilibrium model in the sense that the distribu-
tion of offers that sellers receive is exogenous, and sellers receive exactly one offer per
period. There is no negotiation in the model, leaving sellers with a choice only about
whether to accept or reject a given offer. Once a seller has rejected an offer, they
cannot recall it. I consider the situation in which sellers have no outside assistance in
making their decisions, and the situation in which they are assisted by a real estate
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agent. I assume the agent has complete information regarding the state of the housing
market but has incentives that are not entirely aligned with the seller’s. In the body
of the paper I consider a two-period model; in the appendix I consider extending the
model to multiple periods. In all cases, I assume that in the last period, the seller
must sell the house for the final offered price.
4.2.1 The Offer Distribution
Offers are the sum of an ‘aggregate demand’ component, z, which is constant
across periods, and an idiosyncratic component, xt, which is distributed i.i.d. across
periods. z is distributed U [zL, zH ], and xt is distributed U [xL, xH ]. z and xt are
independently distributed. Denoting the period t offer as ψt,
ψt = z + xt (4.1)
ψt is distributed according to a ‘modified triangular distribution’.
4
The assumption that the offers a seller receive are a function both of aggregate
market conditions and the buyer’s idiosyncratic taste for the property is essential
to the results of the model, so it is worth discussing further. As mentioned pre-
viously, there is limited empirical evidence on the distribution of offers that home
sellers receive, although Merlo and Ortalo-Magne (2004), using data from England,
document that there is economically meaningful variation in the bids a seller receives
on a given property. One issue of particular relevance is to what extent buyers are
aware of aggregate market conditions, such that their offers reflect these conditions.
In the context of the housing market, it seems likely that buyers are more aware of
overall market conditions than are sellers. As Genesove and Han (2009) argue, the
institutional framework of the housing market is such that homes for sale are promi-
nently advertised and it is straightforward for buyers to locate homes to examine. In
4The p.d.f. is defined in the appendix.
115
contrast, buyers do not advertise themselves and are not “searchable” to sellers, im-
plying that it is easier for buyers than for sellers to acquire information on the state
of the market. For instance, Baryla et al. (2000), document that broker-assisted
buyers reported visiting an average of 3.81 homes per week. Genesove and Han show
that the empirical data concerning buyer search behavior and seller time on market
are consistent with sellers adjusting to demand shocks in the housing market more
slowly than buyers do. These results reassure me that the key features of the offer
distribution I assume are broadly consistent with the realities of the housing market.
4.2.2 The Model with no Realtor
First I consider a two-period model with no realtor. As outlined above, sellers
receive one offer each period, and if they do not accept the first offer they must
accept the second. I assume sellers are risk-neutral, perfectly patient, and do not
bear any flow cost of leaving their homes on the market. Therefore, a seller’s goal
is simply to obtain the highest possible price for their home. Accordingly, a seller
will accept the period 1 offer, ψ1, if and only if it is greater than or equal to the
expectation of the period 2 offer, E[ψ2]. Sellers cannot observe the state of market
demand z or the idiosyncratic component of the offer xt directly, so they must infer
z using Bayes’ Theorem:





Define z̃L,1 = max(zL, ψ1 − xH) and z̃H,1 = min(zH , ψ1 − xL). Then the seller’s
posterior belief about the distribution of z conditional on ψ1 is z ∼ U [z̃L,1, z̃H,1].5
Knowing the seller’s belief about z as a function of ψ1 allows us to calculate the
seller’s expectation of ψ2. The seller’s conditional expectation function, E[ψ2|ψ1], is
plotted in Figure 4.2 for two cases, the first in which xH − xL ≥ zH − zL, and the
5I demonstrate this result along with proofs of the propositions in the appendix.
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second in which zH − zL > xH − xL, and is defined explicitly in the appendix. As the
figure indicates, the seller’s expectation of ψ2 is a weakly increasing function of psi1.
In the first case, E[ψ2|ψ1] ≥ ψ1 when ψ1 ≤ ψ1; in the second case , E[ψ2|ψ1] ≥ ψ1
when ψ1 ≤ xH + zL.
This allows us to state the main result of the model with no realtor.
Proposition 1: When the seller follows the optimal policy, the expected time
to sale in the model with no realtor is weakly decreasing in the state of aggregate
demand, z, while the expected sales price is strictly increasing in z.
Figure 4.3 illustrates the expected time to sale and expected sales price in the
model with no realtor for the two cases. If the variance of the idiosyncratic component
of the offer is greater than the variance of aggregate demand, then the expected time
to sale will be falling for all values of z. If the variance of aggregate demand is
greater, however, the expected time to sale will be constant for very low and very
high values of aggregate demand, while for intermediate values expected time to sale
will be falling in z. Therefore, the model implies that expected time to sale will be
negatively correlated with expected prices.
Although this model is quite simple, it illustrates the essential mechanism by
which incomplete information generates a negative correlation between the strength
of housing demand and the expected time to sale. When sellers are uncertain about
the state of aggregate demand, they follow a reservation price strategy in period 1,
whereas if they could observe z, they would ignore the aggregate demand component
of the offer, which is stable over time, and make their decision based solely on the
idiosyncratic component, x1. With incomplete information, offers with middling val-
ues of x1 will be above the seller’s reservation price when z is high and below the
reservation price when z is low. Therefore, the probability that the seller accepts the
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first period offer is an increasing function of z.
4.2.3 A Two-Period Model with a Realtor
I now introduce a realtor to the two-period model. I assume the realtor can
observe aggregate housing demand z directly. However, in the model the realtor’s
and the seller’s incentives are only partially aligned, so the realtor will not always be
able to signal his knowledge of z to the seller in a credible way. In the model, the
only possible contract between sellers and realtors is one in which the realtor receives
a fixed fraction α of the sales price. Furthermore, I assume the seller must employ a
realtor when selling the house. If there is no sale in period 1, the realtor must pay
flow cost cR at the beginning of period 2 in order to market the house.
6
The realtor can only communicate with the seller by advising him on whether to
accept an offer after it has been received. Although this assumption seems restrictive,
as Levitt and Syverson (2002) argue, if the realtor is constrained to advising the seller
on each offer only after it has been received, there is no way for the realtor to report
the intensity of his preferences credibly. Therefore it is not overly restrictive to limit
the realtor to recommending either ‘accept’ or ‘reject’ after each offer is received.
To fix terminology,denote the realtor’s recommendation about the time t offer as
ξt, with ξt = 0 if the realtor recommends ‘reject’ and ξt = 1 if the realtor recommends
‘accept’. Let f̃(ψ2|ψ1, ξ1) be the seller’s posterior belief about the distribution of ψ2
conditional on the first period offer ψ1 and the realtor’s recommendation ξ1. Finally,
call the seller’s period 1 policy function γ1(ψ1, f̃(ψ2|ψ1, ξ1)), with γ1 = 0 indicating
that the seller rejects the period 1 offer and γ1 = 1 indicating that the seller accepts
the period 1 offer. Then the seller’s period 1 and period 2 value functions can be
6Implicitly, one could imagine that cR is a flow cost the realtor must pay at the beginning of
each period to market the house, but the cost paid at the beginning of period 1 is sunk and does
not affect the realtor’s maximization problem.
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written as:
VS(ψ1, ξ1, 1) =
max
γ1 (1− α){ψ1, E[ψ2|f̃(ψ2|ψ1, ξ1)]}
VS(ψ2, ξ2, 2) = (1− α)ψ2
The realtor’s value functions can be written:
VR(ψ1, z, 1) =
max
ξ1 {γ1(ψ1, f̃(ψ2|ψ1, 0)αψ1 + (1− γ1(ψ1, f̃(ψ2|ψ1, 0)))(E[VR(ψ2, z, 2)]),
γ1(ψ1, f̃(ψ2|ψ1, 1)αψ1 + (1− γ1(ψ1, f̃(ψ2|ψ1, 1)))(E[VR(ψ2, z, 2)])}
VR(ψ2, z, 2) = −cR + αψ2
It is then natural to define a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game between re-
altors and sellers as a policy function ξ1(ψ1, z) for the realtor, a policy function
γ1(ψ1, f̃(ψ2|ψ1, ξ1)) for the seller, and a belief updating strategy f̃(ψ2|ψ1, ξ1) for the
seller such that:
1. ξ1(ψ1, z) maximizes the realtor’s value function for all (ψ1, z), taking γ1(ψ1, f̃(ψ2|ψ1, ξ1))
as given;
2. γ1(ψ1, f̃(ψ2|ψ1, ξ1)) maximizes the seller’s value function for all ψ1, ξ1 taking
ξ1(ψ1, z) as given; and
3. f̃(ψ2|ψ1, ξ1) is consistent with ξ1(ψ1, z).
Consider what the realtor would choose if he could decide which offers the seller
would accept and which he would reject. After some algebra, the realtor’s value
function in period 1 can be re-written
VR(ψ1, z, 1) = αz +max{αx1, αx− cr}
Therefore, in period 1 the realtor would prefer that the seller accept any offer ψ1 such
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that αx1 ≥ αx−cr, or equivalently, x1 ≥ x− crα . Denote x− crα as x̂1, which represents
the realtor’s cutoff value of x1, i.e. the realtor would like the seller to accept all offers
with an idiosyncratic component x1 above x̂1 and reject all others.
7 Note that cr
α
measures the degree of misalignment between the seller’s and the realtor’s incentives.
If cr
α
were zero, the realtor’s and seller’s incentives would be perfectly aligned.
The following is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game between the realtor
and the seller. The realtor reports ‘accept’ (ξ1 = 1) for any offer such that x1 ≥ x̂1
and ‘reject’ (ξ1 = 0) for any offer such that x1 < x̂1. Define x̃L,1 as xL if the realtor
recommends reject and x̂1 if the realtor recommends accept, and define x̃H,1 as x̂1
if the realtor recommends reject and xH if the realtor recommends accept. Further,
define z̃L,1 = max(zL, ψ1 − x̃H,1) and z̃H,1 = min(zH , ψ1 − x̃L,1). Then the seller’s
posterior belief is that z ∼ U [z̃L,1, z̃H,1].8
Figure 4.4 displays the seller’s expectation of ψ2 as a function of psi1 and the
realtor’s recommendation ξ1. The red lines show the expectation when the realtor
recommends reject and the green lines show the expectation when the realtor recom-
mends accept; the dashed portions of the red and green lines show off-equilibrium
path recommendations. As before, I show two cases, differentiated by whether z or
x has the higher variance conditional on the realtor’s recommendation. The figure il-
lustrates that the seller’s expectation of ψ2 is always greater than ψ1 when the realtor
recommends ‘reject’. Therefore, the seller will always reject the first offer when the
realtor recommends it. However, the opposite is not true: the seller will sometimes
reject an offer when the realtor recommends ‘accept’. These cases arise when the
seller’s expectation of ψ2 is greater than psi1 despite the realtor’s recommendation to
accept the offer. They are illustrated in the figure as values of ψ1 for which the green
line is above the dashed blue line.
7I assume that α and cR are such that x̂1 ≥ xL.
8I do not currently offer a proof but it would follow the proof of the seller’s belief updating
strategy with no realtor very closely.
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To verify that reporting his own preference truthfully is a best response for the
realtor, note that in equilibrium, the realtor’s recommendation weakly increases the
chance that the seller will take the realtor’s preferred action. For very high and very
low values of ψ1, the realtor’s recommendation will not affect the seller’s decision,
so any policy the realtor follows is a best response. However, for medium values
of ψ1, the expected value of ψ2 when the realtor recommends ‘accept’ is below ψ1,
but the expected value of ψ2 when the realtor recommends ‘reject’ is above ψ1. For
these offers, the realtor’s recommendation will be decisive - the seller will follow the
realtor’s recommendation. Therefore, for this range of offers it must also be a best
response for the realtor to report his own preference truthfully. This allows us to
state Proposition 2, which shows that the main result from the model with no realtor
continues to hold when the realtor is added to the model.
Proposition 2: In the equilibrium I consider, the expected time to sale in the
model with a realtor is weakly decreasing in the state of aggregate demand, z, while
the expected sales price is strictly increasing in z.
Figure 4.5 illustrates the expected time to sale and sales price as a function z.
The expected sales price is a strictly increasing function of z, but the expected time
on market is weakly decreasing with z. Specifically, when the variance of z is large,
there will be a range in which the expected time to sale does not depend on z.
4.3 Empirics
A key prediction of the model presented above is that the correlations between
prices, time on market, and sales volumes are driven by seller confusion over the
true state of the housing market. To test this prediction, I construct a measure of
homeowner perceptions of housing values using data from the American Community
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Survey. I then compare this measure to an index of home values provided by Zil-
low.com to construct a measure of homeowner misperceptions of housing values both
at the MSA and state levels. Finally, I regress sales volumes on the misperceptions
index to test whether homeowner misperceptions of the state of the housing mar-
ket influence sales levels. I conclude by exploring the determinants of homeowner
misperceptions about the housing market.
4.3.1 Constructing the Misperceptions Indices
I begin by constructing time series house value indices at the state and MSA
levels. I use data from the American Community Survey 1% national samples, in
which homeowners were asked to self-report the dollar value of their homes, as well
as to report a rich set of physical characteristics of their homes. The data is available
yearly from 2000 to 2010 at the state level, but MSA level identifiers are only available
from 2005-2010. At the state level, there are approximately 6.5 million home value
observations in the data set, just over 100,000 in year 2000, between 300,000 and
400,000 per year between 2001 and 2004, and about 840,000 per year thereafter.
Approximately 680,000 of these observations per year are located in MSAs from 2005
to 2010.
To construct my housing value indices, within each geographical area I regress log
self-reported house values on the following set of covariates9: survey year dummies, 9
indicators of building size, 9 indicators for the number of rooms, 5 indicators for the
number of bedrooms, the number of rooms interacted with the number of bedrooms,
2 indicators for lot size, 13 indicators for when the building was built, 2 indicators
for complete plumbing and kitchen facilities, an indicator for commercial use, and an
indicator for condominium status. I take the coefficients on the year dummies to be
9To maintain comparability with the Zillow Home Value Index, which measures median home
values, I use quantile regression. To aid convergence in the state level regressions, I drop the most
and least expensive 5% of houses each year.
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my perceived housing value time series indices.
To construct my misperceptions indices, I compare the perceived housing value
indices to the Zillow Home Value Indices (hereafter, ZHVI) published by Zillow.com.
These indices measure the value of the median non-distressed owner-occupied home
in a given geographical area over time. The ZHVI lines up well with other indices
of housing values such as the Case-Shiller index and the Federal Housing Finance
Authority index. I restrict my data set to MSAs and states with complete ZHVI
and sales volume data; because some states with very low sales volumes show an
implausible amount of volatility in the ZHVI, at the state level I also require that
Zillow reports average sales volumes of at least 2,000 houses a month. This leaves me
with 23 states and 113 MSAs.
Figure 9 displays the perceived and Zillow home value indices for the 23 states in
my data set, with values in 2000 normalized to zero. Figure 11 displays the same series
at the MSA level for 19 of the 20 MSAs in the Case-Shiller 20-city house price index,
with values in 2005 normalized to zero. I construct the misperceptions index as the
difference between these series, i.e. the misperceptions index is the vertical distance
between the lines in Figures 9 and 11. Figures 10 and 12 display the misperceptions
indices along with the log change in home sales volumes from the base year at the
state and MSA levels, respectively.10
4.3.2 Misperceptions and Home Sales
Table 1 shows fixed effects regressions at the state level of log home sale volumes
on the misperceptions index. The time period is 2000 to 2010. Columns 1 through
4 are specified in levels, while columns 5 through 8 are specified in first differences;
columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 include the ZHVI, while columns 3, 4, 7, and 8 include year
fixed effects. Consistent with the theory, the coefficient on the misperceptions index is
10I show the change in sales volumes rather than the level in order to better illustrate the variation,
but I use levels in the regression analysis.
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negative in all specifications, significantly so in all columns except for column 7. The
coefficient on the misperceptions index becomes somewhat weaker when year fixed
effects are included or the model is specified in first differences. An attractive feature
of the state-level data is that it includes a period of broadly rising prices from 2000
to 2006, as well as a period of broadly falling prices from 2006 to 2010, as opposed
to the MSA-level data, which cover a period of mostly falling prices. The coefficient
on the ZHVI is not significant in the state level specifications without the year fixed
effects, but is negative and statistically significant in the specifications with the year
fixed effects.
Table 2 shows similar regressions at the MSA level. The time period included is
2005 to 2010. As predicted by the model, the coefficient on the misperceptions index
is negative in all specifications, although it is statistically insignificant in columns 3
and 7. As in table 1, including year fixed effects and specifying the model in first
differences weakens the effect of misperceptions. Interestingly, the effect of the ZHVI
is significantly negative in all specifications, in contrast to the pattern we observe
when sales are not conditioned on homeowner perceptions of the housing market.
Taking column 2 of table 1 as my baseline specification, these results suggest an
elasticity of sales volumes with respect to misperceptions of approximately 1.7. The
within-R2 of the simple fixed effects regression of sales volumes on the misperceptions
index is 0.24 at the state level and 0.21 at the MSA level, suggesting that homeowner
misperceptions alone can explain over a fifth of the time variation in sales volumes.
4.3.3 Determinants of Misperceptions
In table 3, I briefly explore the empirical determinants of homeowner mispercep-
tions of housing market conditions. The dependent variable in both specifications is
the standard deviation of the misperceptions index, which I take to be an indicator
of how much perceptions tend to deviate from actual market prices. Column 1 ex-
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plores misperceptions at the MSA level, while column 2 examines the state level. At
both levels, variation in market prices is the strongest predictor of misperceptions,
accounting for roughly half of the variation in misperceptions in a simple regression.
As additional covariates, I examine two different measures of heterogeneity in the
housing stock. At the MSA level, I consider the ratio of the ZHVI of the most ex-
pensive third of houses to the ZHVI of the least expensive third. At the state level, I
consider the median error of the ZHVI, that is the median difference between Zillow’s
predicted house value and a home’s actual sales price.11
Both measures of housing stock heterogeneity are predictive of a higher level of
misperceptions. At the MSA level, a one standard deviation increase in the ratio of top
to bottom ZHVIs is associated with an approximately one-quarter standard deviation
increase in the standard deviation of misperceptions. At the state level, a one standard
deviation increase in the median error of the ZHVI is associated with a nearly one-
half standard deviation increase in the standard deviation of misperceptions. These
results suggest that increasing heterogeneity of the housing stock across metro areas is
associated with greater homeowner misperceptions of the state of the housing market.
4.4 Conclusion
This paper demonstrates that astylized model of the house-selling process in which
sellers have incomplete information regarding the state of the housing market can
generate the negative correlation between prices and time on market observed in the
data. Importantly, this effect can persist if sellers employ realtors with complete
information about the state of housing demand as long as the incentives of realtors
and sellers are not perfectly aligned. Empirically, an increase in homeowners’ percep-
11I consider an increase in both of these variables to represent increasing heterogeneity in an area’s
housing stock. I do not consider the ratio of high to low ZHVIs at the state level because this ratio
at the state level is likely to reflect variation in urbanization rates as much as heterogeniety in the
housing stock. I do not consider the median error of the ZHVI at the MSA level because Zillow only
publishes it for a very small number of large MSAs.
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tions of house prices relative to true market conditions predicts a decrease in sales
volumes. Homeowner misperceptions of housing market conditions appear to account
for between one-fifth and one-quarter of the variation in sales volumes.
4.5 Appendix
4.5.1 Proofs of Propositions
4.5.1.1 The p.d.f. of ψ





(xH−xL)(zH−zL) if ψL ≤ ψ ≤ ψL +min(xH − xL, zH − zL)
1
max(xH−xL,zH−zL)
if ψL +min(xH − xL, zH − zL) ≤ ψ
≤ ψL +max(xH − xL, zH − zL)
ψH−ψ
(xH−xL)(zH−zL) if ψL +max(xH − xL, zH − zL) ≤ ψ ≤ ψH






(xH−xL) if z + xL ≤ ψ ≤ z + xH
0 otherwise
There are multiple cases to consider to verify that the seller’s posterior distribution
for z is z ∼ U [z̃L, z̃H ].
Case 1: xH − xL ≥ zH − zL
Case 1a: ψ ≤ xL + zH . In this range, f(ψ) = ψ−ψL(xH−xL)(zH−zL) . If z < zL or
z > zH , f(z) = 0. If z < ψ − xH or z > ψ − xL, f(ψ|z) = 0. Therefore,
f(z|ψ) = 0 if z < max(zL, ψ − xH) ≡ z̃L or if z > min(zH , ψ − xL) ≡ z̃H . In
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the range [z̃L, z̃H ],










To see that fZ(z|Ψ = ψ) is a proper density, note that in this case z̃L = zL
and z̃H = ψ − xL, so that z̃H − z̃L = ψ − xL − zL = ψ − ψL.
Case 1b: xL + zH ≤ ψ ≤ xH + zL. In this case, f(ψ) = 1xH−xL , f(z) = 1zH−zL ,
f(ψ|z) = 1
xH−xL , z̃L = zL, and z̃H = zH . Then in the range [z̃L, z̃H ],










and fZ(z|Ψ = ψ) = 0 elsewhere.
Case 1c: xH + zL < ψ. In this case f(ψ) =
ψH−ψ
(xH−xL)(zH−zL) . f(ψ|z) = 1xH−xL ,
f(z) = 1
zH−zL , z̃L = ψ − xH , and z̃H = zH . Then in the range [z̃L, z̃H ],










and fZ(z|Ψ = ψ) = 0 elsewhere. Because z̃H − z̃L = xH + zH − ψ = ψH − ψ,
the posterior distribution is a proper density.
Case 2: zH − zL > xH − xL.
Case 2a: ψ < xH + zL. In this case the proof is the same as in case 1a.
Case 2b: xH + zL ≤ ψ ≤ xL + zH . In this case f(ψ) = 1zH−zL , f(z) = 1zH−zL ,
f(ψ|z) = 1
xH−xL , z̃L = ψ − xH , and z̃H = ψ − xL. Then in the range [z̃L, z̃H ],










and fZ(z|Ψ = ψ) = 0 elsewhere. Because z̃H − z̃L = ψ − xL − (ψ − xH) =
xH − xL, the posterior distribution is a proper density.
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Case 2c: xL + zH < ψ. In this case the proof is the same as in case 1c.
4.5.1.3 The seller’s expectation of ψ2 conditional on ψ1





. Then E[ψ2|ψ1] = x + z̃1. If we further define
z = zL+zH
2
, we can write the unconditional expectation of ψ as E[ψ] = ψ = x+ z. If






if ψL ≤ ψ1 < xL + zH
ψ if xL + zH ≤ ψ1 ≤ xH + zL
ψ1+xL+zH
2
if xH + zL < ψ1 ≤ ψH
Then for all ψ1 < ψ, ψ1 < E[ψ2|ψ1], while for all ψ1 ≥ ψ, ψ1 ≥ E[ψ2|ψ1].






if ψL ≤ ψ1 < xH + zL
ψ1 if xH + zL ≤ ψ1 ≤ xL + zH
ψ1+xL+zH
2
if xL + zH < ψ1 ≤ ψH
Then for all ψ1 < xH + zL, ψ1 < E[ψ2|ψ1], while for all ψ1 ≥ xH + zL, ψ1 ≥ E[ψ2|ψ1].
4.5.1.4 Proof of Proposition 1
We assume the seller will accept any offer ψ1 ≥ E[ψ2|ψ1]. Let t(z) denote the
expected number of periods the seller leaves his house on the market. Then if xH −
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xL ≥ zH − zL:
t(z) = Pr(ψ1 ≥ ψ) + 2Pr(ψ1 < ψ)
= Pr(x1 ≥ ψ − z) + 2Pr(x1 < ψ − z)
= 1− ψ − xL − z
xH − xL + 2
ψ − xL − z
xH − xL
= 1 +







xH − xL < 0
Now consider the case in which zH − zL > xH − xL:
t(z) = Pr(ψ1 ≥ xH + zL) + 2Pr(ψ1 < xH + zL)
= Pr(x1 ≥ xH + zL − z) + 2Pr(x1 < xH + zL − z)
If z > xH −xL+ zL, Pr(x1 ≥ xH + zL− z) = 1, so t = 1+0 = 1. If z ≤ xH −xL+ zL,
t(z) = 1− xH − xL + zL − z
xH − xL + 2
xH − xL + zL − z
xH − xL
= 1 +
xH − xL + zL − z
xH − xL
= 2− z − zL
xH − xL





xH−xL if zL ≤ z ≤ xH − xL + zL









xH−xL if zL ≤ z ≤ xH − xL + zL
0 if xH − xL + zL ≤ z ≤ zH
Therefore, ∂t
∂z
must always be weakly negative.
Let p(z) denote the expected sales price for the house. When xH − xL ≥ zH − zL,
p(z) = Pr(ψ1 ≥ x+ z)E[ψ1|ψ1 ≥ x+ z] + Pr(ψ1 < x+ z)E[ψ2]
= Pr(x1 ≥ x+ z − z)E[ψ1|ψ1 ≥ x+ z] + Pr(x1 < x+ z − z)E[ψ2]
= (1− x− xL + z − z
xH − xL )(
x+ xH + z + z
2
) + (
x− xL + z − z
xH − xL )(x+ z)
=
x+ xH + z + z
2
+ (
x− xL + z − z
xH − xL )(





= 1 + z−z
xH−xL . To see that this must always be positive, consider the
case z = zH . Then
∂p
∂z
= 1 + z−zH
xH−xL =
xH−xL−(zH−z)
xH−xL . z > zL, so zH − z < zH − zL.
By assumption, xH − xL ≥ zH − zL. Therefore the numerator of this expression is
positive, and ∂p
∂z
> 0 when xH − xL ≥ zH − zL.
When zH − zL > xH − xL,
p(z) = Pr(ψ1 ≥ xH + zL)E[ψ1|ψ1 ≥ xH + zL] + Pr(ψ1 < xH + zL)E[ψ2]
= Pr(x1 ≥ xH + zL − z)E[ψ1|ψ1 ≥ xH + zL] + Pr(x1 < xH + zL − z)E[ψ2]
If z ≥ xH − xL + zL, Pr(ψ1 ≥ xH + zL) = 1, and E[ψ1|ψ1 ≥ xH + zL] = E[ψ1]. Then
p = x+ z, so ∂p
∂z
= 1. If z < xH − xL + zL, Pr(ψ1 ≥ xH + zL) = z−zLxH−xL . Then
p = (
z − zL
xH − xL )(xH +
zL + z
2
) + (1− z − zL
xH − xL )(x+ z)
= x+ z + (
z − zL
xH − xL )(













− z − zL
xH − xL








) if zL ≤ z ≤ xH − xL + zL










xH−xL if zL ≤ z ≤ xH − xL + zL
1 if xH − xL + zL ≤ z ≤ zH
By assumption z < xH − xL + zL, so z−zLxH−xL < 1. Therefore
∂p
∂z
> 0 when zH − zL >
xH − xL and z < xH − xL + zL, implying that ∂p∂z > 0 in all cases. 
4.5.1.5 Proof of Proposition 2
Let ψ̃L = z̃L,1 + xL and ψ̃L = z̃L,1 + xL. The seller’s posterior belief about the





(xH−xL)(z̃H,1−z̃L,1) if ψ̃L ≤ ψ ≤ ψ̃L +min(xH − xL, z̃H,1 − z̃L,1)
1
max(xH−xL,z̃H,1−z̃L,1)
if ψ̃L +min(xH − xL, z̃H,1 − z̃L,1) ≤ ψ
≤ ψ̃L +max(xH − xL, z̃H,1 − z̃L,1)
ψ̃H−ψ
(xH−xL)(z̃H,1−z̃L,1) if ψ̃L +max(xH − xL, z̃H,1 − z̃L,1) ≤ ψ ≤ ψ̃H
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if x̂1 + zL ≤ ψ1 ≤ x̂1 + zH
x+ z if x̂1 + zH ≤ ψ1 ≤ xH + zL
x+ z + ψ1−xH−zL
2
if xH + zL ≤ ψ1 ≤ ψH






if x̂1 + zL ≤ ψ1 ≤ xH + zL
ψ1 − x̂1−xL2 if xH + zL ≤ ψ1 ≤ x̂1 + zH
ψ1+xL+zH
2
if x̂1 + zH ≤ ψ1 ≤ ψH
In case 1, if x̂1 + zH ≤ x + z (call this case 1a), ψ1 ≥ E[ψ2|f̃(ψ2|ψ1, 1)] when
ψ1 ≥ x + z and ψ1 < E[ψ2|f̃(ψ2|ψ1, 1)] otherwise. If x̂1 + zH > x + z (case 1b),
ψ1 ≥ E[ψ2|f̃(ψ2|ψ1, 1)] when ψ1 ≥ xL + xH − x̂1 + zL and ψ1 < E[ψ2|f̃(ψ2|ψ1, 1)]
otherwise. In case 2 ψ1 ≥ E[ψ2|f̃(ψ2|ψ1, 1)] when ψ1 ≥ xL + xH − x̂1 + zL and
ψ1 < E[ψ2|f̃(ψ2|ψ1, 1)] otherwise.
Again, we assume the seller accepts any offer ψ1 ≥ E[ψ2|ψ1, ξ1]. Recall that the
seller always rejects an offer when the realtor recommends ‘reject’. Then in case 1a
(xH − x̂1 ≥ zH − zL and x̂1 + zH ≤ x+ z),
t(z) = 2Pr(ξ1 = 0) + Pr(ψ1 ≥ x+ z ∩ ξ1 = 1) + 2Pr(ψ1 < x+ z ∩ ξ1 = 1)
=
2(x̂1 − xL)
xH − xL + (1−
x̂1 − xL
xH − xL )(Pr(x1 ≥ x+ z − z|ξ1 = 1) + 2Pr(x1 < x+ z − z|ξ1 = 1))
=
2(x̂1 − xL)
xH − xL + (1−
x̂1 − xL
xH − xL )(1−
x− x̂1 + z − z
xH − x̂1 + 2(
x− x̂1 + z − z
xH − x̂1 ))
= 1 +
x̂1 − xL
xH − xL + (
xH − x̂1
xH − xL )(
x− x̂1 + z − z
xH − x̂1 )
= 1 +
x− xL + z − z
xH − xL
132





xH − xL < 0
In cases 1b and 2 (x̂1 + zH > x+ z),
t(z) = 2Pr(ξ1 = 0) + Pr(ψ1 ≥ xL + xH − x̂1 + zL ∩ ξ1 = 1)
+ 2Pr(ψ1 < xL + xH − x̂1 + zL ∩ ξ1 = 1)
=
2(x̂1 − xL)
xH − xL + (1−
x̂1 − xL
xH − xL )(Pr(x1 ≥ xL + xH − x̂1 + zL − z|ξ1 = 1)
+ 2Pr(x1 < xL + xH − x̂1 + zL − z|ξ1 = 1))
If z > xL + xH − 2x̂1 + zL, Pr(x1 ≥ xL + xH − x̂1 + zL − z|ξ1 = 1) = 1. In that
case t = 2Pr(ξ1 = 0) + Pr(ξ1 = 1) = 2
(x̂1−xL)
xH−xL + (1 −
x̂1−xL
xH−xL ) = 1 +
x̂1−xL
xH−xL . If
z < xL + xH − 2x̂1 + zL,
t(z) =
2(x̂1 − xL)
xH − xL + (1−
x̂1 − xL
xH − xL )
× (1− xL + xH − 2x̂1 + zL − z
xH − x̂1 + 2(
xL + xH − 2x̂1 + zL − z
xH − x̂1 ))
=
2(x̂1 − xL)
xH − xL + (1−
x̂1 − xL
xH − xL )(1 +
xL + xH − 2x̂1 + zL − z
xH − x̂1 )
= 1 +
x̂1 − xL
xH − xL + (
xH − x̂1
xH − xL )(
xL + xH − 2x̂1 + zL − z
xH − x̂1 )
= 1 +
xH − x̂1 + zL − z
xH − xL





xH−xL if zL ≤ z < xL + xH − 2x̂1 + zL
1 + x̂1−xL









xH−xL if zL ≤ z < xL + xH − 2x̂1 + zL
0 if xL + xH − 2x̂1 + zL ≤ z ≤ zH
In case 2 (zH − zL > xH − x̂1),
t(z) = 2Pr(ξ1 = 0) + Pr(ψ1 ≥ xL + xH − x̂1 + zL ∩ ξ1 = 1)
+ 2Pr(ψ1 < xL + xH − x̂1 + zL ∩ ξ1 = 1)
=
2(x̂1 − xL)
xH − xL + (1−
x̂1 − xL
xH − xL )(Pr(x1 ≥ xL + xH − x̂1 + zL − z|ξ1 = 1)
+ 2Pr(x1 < xL + xH − x̂1 + zL − z|ξ1 = 1))
If z > xL + xH − 2x̂1 + zL, Pr(x1 ≥ xL + xH − x̂1 + zL − z|ξ1 = 1) = 1. In that









= 0. If z < xL + xH − 2x̂1 + zL,
t(z) =
2(x̂1 − xL)
xH − xL + (1−
x̂1 − xL
xH − xL )
× (1− xL + xH − x̂1 + zL − z
xH − x̂1 + 2(
xL + xH − x̂1 + zL − z
xH − x̂1 ))
=
2(x̂1 − xL)
xH − xL + (1−
x̂1 − xL
xH − xL )(1 +
xL + xH − x̂1 + zL − z




= (1− x̂1 − xL
xH − xL )
−1
xH − x̂1 < 0









xH−x̂1 if zL ≤ z < xL + xH − 2x̂1 + zL
0 if xL + xH − 2x̂1 + zL ≤ z ≤ zH
Thus, ∂t
∂z
must always be weakly negative.
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In case 1a,
p(z) = Pr(ξ1 = 0)E[ψ2] + Pr(ξ1 = 1) [Pr(ψ1 ≥ x+ z|ξ1 = 1)E[ψ1|ψ1 ≥ x+ z, ξ1 = 1]
+Pr(ψ1 < x+ z|ξ1 = 1)E[ψ2])]
= (
x̂1 − xL
xH − xL )(x+ z) + (1−
x̂1 − xL
xH − xL )
[
(1− x− x̂1 + z − z
xH − x̂1 )(z +




x− x̂1 + z − z





(x2 + x2H − z2 − z2)− xLx+ (xH − xL + z)z
xH − xL




xH − xL + z − z
xH − xL




xH − xL + z − zH
xH − xL =
xH − xL − zH−zL2
xH − xL
By assumption xH − xL ≥ xH − x̂1 ≥ zH − zL, so ∂p∂z ≥ 0 in case 1a. In cases 1b and
2, if z > xL + xH − 2x̂1 + zL (so that the seller will always accept the period 1 offer
if the realtor recommends accept),
p = Pr(ξ1 = 0)E[ψ2] + Pr(ξ1 = 1)E[ψ1|x1 ≥ x̂1]
= (
x̂1 − xL
xH − xL )(x+ z) + (1−
x̂1 − xL





(x̂1 − xL)(xL + xH) + (xH − x̂1)(x̂1 + xH)
2(xH − xL) + z
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If z < xL + xH − 2x̂1 + zL,
p(z) = Pr(ξ1 = 0)E[ψ2] + Pr(ξ1 = 1) (Pr(ψ1 ≥ xL + xH − x̂1 + zL|x1 ≥ x̂1)
×E[ψ1|ψ1 ≥ xL + xH − x̂1 + zL, x1 ≥ x̂1] + Pr(ψ1 < xL + xH − x̂1 + zL|x1 ≥ x̂1)E[ψ2])
= (
x̂1 − xL
xH − xL )(x+ z) + (1−
x̂1 − xL
xH − xL )
[
(1− xL + xH − 2x̂1 + zL − z
xH − x̂1 )
×(z + xL + xH − x̂1 + zL − z + xH
2
) + (
xL + xH − 2x̂1 + zL − z













2) + (x+ zL)x̂1 + (xH + zL)x
− (xH + zL + zH)xL + (2xH − x− x̂1 − xL + zL)z
)














if zL ≤ z
< xL + xH − 2x̂1 + zL
(x̂1−xL)(xL+xH)+(xH−x̂1)(x̂1+xH)
2(xH−xL) + z









xH−xL if zL ≤ z < xL + xH − 2x̂1 + zL
1 if xL + xH − 2x̂1 + zL ≤ z ≤ zH
To see that ∂p
∂z
> 0 when z ≤ xL + xH − 2x̂1 + zL, note that 2xH − x − x̂1 + zL ≥
xL + xH − 2x̂1 + zL is equivalent to xH − xL ≥ x − x̂1, which must be true because
xH ≥ x and x̂1 ≥ xL. Therefore ∂p∂z > 0 in cases 1b and 2. 
4.5.2 Extending the Model to Multiple Periods
This section of the paper will relax one of the more restrictive assumptions in
the previous sections, that the seller must accept the second period offer if he rejects
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the first period offer. Although the present paper extends the model only to allow
for a third period, hopefully this extension will illustrate the key differences between
a two period and multiple period model and present an equilibrium concept that
is compatible with any finite number of periods. There are two main differences
between the equilibria of the two period model and the three period model. First, in
the first period of the three period model, the realtor’s cutoff rule for recommending
‘accept’ will be a function of z. Second, in equilibrium there will be ranges of first-
period offers for which the realtor will ”babble”: his recommendation will contain no
information regarding the state of demand, and consequently the seller will ignore
it when updating his beliefs. Without this feature of equilibrium, the realtor will
sometimes have an incentive to misreport his own preference regarding the seller’s
decision in period 1 in order to manipulate the seller’s beliefs regarding the state of
demand.
The notation of the three-period model will follow the notation of the two-period
model closely. The realtor’s recommendation in period t shall be denoted ξt and
the seller’s decision in period t shall be denoted γt, where in both cases a value
of 1 indicates ‘accept’ and a value of 0 indicates ‘reject’. Let x̂1(z) and x̂2 denote
the realtor’s cutoff value for reporting ‘accept’ in periods 1 and 2, respectively. As
discussed, in equilibrium there will be some values for ψ1 such that the realtor will
babble; for all other values of ψ1 the realtor will employ a cutoff rule in x1 to determine
his recommendation, but the cutoff will be a function of z. Let z̃L,t and z̃H,t denote
the seller’s beliefs about the lowest and highest possible values of z after receiving the
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period t offer and recommendation. Then the realtor’s value function can be written:
VR(ψ1, z, 1) =
max
ξ1 {γ1(ψ1, f̃(ψ|ψ1, 0)αψ1 + (1− γ1(ψ1, f̃(ψ|ψ1, 0)))
× (E[VR(ψ2, z, z̃L,1, z̃H,1, 2)|ξ1 = 0]),
γ2(ψ1, f̃(ψ|ψ1, 1)αψ1 + (1− γ1(ψ1, f̃(ψ|ψ1, 1)))
× (E[VR(ψ2, z, z̃L,1, z̃H,1, 2)|ξ1 = 1])}
VR(ψ2, z, z̃L,1, z̃H,1, 2) =
max
ξ2 {γ2(ψ2, f̃(ψ|ψ2, 0, z̃L,1, z̃H,1)αψ2+
(1− γ2(ψ2, f̃(ψ2|ψ2, 0, z̃L,1, z̃H,1)))(E[VR(ψ3, z, z̃L,2, z̃H,2, 3)|ξ2 = 0]),
γ2(ψ2, f̃(ψ|ψ1, 1, z̃L,1, z̃H,1)αψ2+
(1− γ2(ψ2, f̃(ψ2|ψ1, 1, z̃L,1, z̃H,1)))(E[VR(ψ2, z, z̃L,2, z̃H,2, 2)|ξ2 = 1])}
VR(ψ3, z, z̃L,2, z̃H,2, 3) = −cR + αψ3
The seller’s value function can be written:
VS(ψ1, ξ1, 1) =
max
γ1 (1− α){ψ1, E[VS(ψ2, ξ2, z̃L,1, z̃H,1, 2)|f̃(ψ2|ψ1, ξ1)]}
VS(ψ2, ξ2, z̃L,1, z̃H,1, 2) =
max
γ2 (1− α){ψ2, E[ψ3|f̃(ψ3|ψ1, ξ2, )]}
VS(ψ3, ξ3, z̃L,2, z̃H,2, 3) = (1− α)ψ3
Then we can update our equilibrium definition as follows.
Definition: a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game between realtors and
sellers is a set of policy functions ξ1(ψ1, z) and ξ2(ψ2, z, z̃L,1, z̃H,1) for the realtor, a
set of policy functions γ1(ψ1, f̃(ψ2|ψ1, ξ1)) and γ2(ψ2, f̃(ψ3|ψ2, ξ2, z̃L,1, z̃H,1)) for the
seller, and a set of belief updating strategies f̃(ψ2|ψ1, ξ1) and f̃(ψ3|ψ2, ξ2, z̃L,1, z̃H,1)
138
for the seller such that:
1. ξ1(ψ1, z) and ξ2(ψ2, z, z̃L,1, z̃H,1) solve the realtor’s problem taking the seller’s pol-
icy functions and belief updating strategies as given;
2. γ1(ψ1, f̃(ψ2|ψ1, ξ1)) and γ2(ψ2, f̃(ψ3|ψ2, ξ2, z̃L,1, z̃H,1)) solve the seller’s problem tak-
ing the realtor’s policy functions as given; and
3. f̃(ψ2|ψ1, ξ1) and f̃(ψ3|ψ2, ξ2, z̃L,1, z̃H,1) are consistent with the realtor’s policy func-
tions.
As discussed, the first main difference between the equilibria of three-period model
and the two-period model is that in the first period of the three-period model, the
realtor’s optimal cutoff strategy is a function of z. This is because when z is low, it is
more likely that ψ2 will be so low enough that the seller rejects the offer regardless of
the realtor’s recommendation, and this loss of control lowers the realtor’s payoff. To
determine the realtor’s optimal cutoff rule in period 1, consider the realtor’s payoff
minus αz. If the seller accepts an offer in period t, this value will be α(xt−cR(t−1)).
Call this value the idiosyncratic component of the realtor’s payoff. The realtor will
receive the αz portion of his payoff no matter which offer the seller accepts, but
the idiosyncratic portion of his payoff depends on the seller’s decisions and on the
realizations of xt. If the seller accepts the first period offer, the idiosyncratic portion
of the realtor’s payoff is αx1. Therefore the realtor would prefer that the seller accept
any period 1 offers such that αx1 ≥ E[α(xt−cR(t−1))] and to reject all others. Recall
that the realtor’s preference in the penultimate period is for the seller to accept any
offers such that x2 ≥ x − cRα and reject all others. Call this value x̂2. Then the
realtor’s optimal cutoff rule in period 1 is defined implicitly by the following mapping

















if x̂2 + z̃H,1(x̂1) ≥ x+ z̃1(x̂1)




if x̂2 + z̃H,1(x̂1) ≥ x+ z̃1(x̂1)
and z < xL + xH − 2x̂2+z̃L,1(x̂1)
Because x̂1(z) is the fixed point of this functional equation, I have estimated it
numerically. A description of the estimation algorithm is included at the end of this
section. Figure 6 illustrates the realtor’s optimal period 1 cutoff rule as a function
of z.
Given the realtor’s cutoff rule, the seller will update his beliefs concerning z as




max(zL, ˜̃z) if γ1 = 0




min(zH , ψ1 − xL) if γ1 = 0
min(˜̃z, ψ1 − xL) if γ1 = 1
Then the seller’s posterior belief about the distribution of z will again be that
z ∼ U [z̃L,1, z̃H,1].12 In period 2, the seller’s belief updating strategy will be the same
as the one outlined in the two-period model.
The second main difference between the equilibria of the two and three period
models is the presence of ‘babbling regions’ in period 1 of the three period model. To
see that these regions are a necessary feature of equilibrium, consider a hypothetical
12Again I omit the proof, but it will follow the proof of Lemma 1 closely.
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equilibrium in which the realtor always reports his own preference truthfully to the
seller in period 1, and in which the realtor’s and seller’s behavior in the second period
is the same as their behavior in the first period of the two-period model. Then the
seller’s expected value of rejecting the first offer would look as in the top panel of
figure 7. Define ψ1 as the fixed point of the seller’s expected value of waiting for period
2 conditional on the realtor recommending ‘accept’, and ψ†1 as the fixed point of the
seller’s expected value of waiting for period 2 conditional on the realtor recommending
‘reject’. Then for ψ1 < ψ

1, the expected value of waiting for period 2 is higher than
ψ1 whether the the realtor recommends ‘accept’ or ‘reject’–the seller’s action will not
depend on the realtor’s recommendation in this range. Similarly, when ψ1 > ψ
†
1, the
expected value of waiting for period 2 will be below ψ1 no matter what the realtor
recommends. Therefore, the seller will always reject offers ψ1 < ψ

1 and will always
accept offers ψ1 > ψ
†
1.
Consider the realtor’s best response when ψ1 < ψ

1 and x1 > x̂1(z) in the hypo-
thetical equilibrium. No matter what the realtor recommends, the seller will reject
the offer. However, because the seller expects the realtor to report his own prefer-
ence regarding the offer truthfully, the seller will have a higher expectation of future
offers if the realtor recommends ‘reject’ (thus indicating that z is high) than if the
realtor recommends ‘accept’ (indicating that z is low). Intuitively, this state of affairs
cannot be optimal for the realtor: we have shown in the two-period model that in
the second-to-last period, the seller will always reject an offer that the realtor rec-
ommends rejecting. However, there are second-period offers the realtor recommends
accepting that the seller will not accept. Therefore, the realtor will always prefer that
the seller be more pessimistic (have a lower expectation of ψ) in the second period: a
pessimistic seller is more likely to accept offers the realtor would like him to accept,
but will always reject offers the realtor would like him to reject. Therefore, the realtor
has a unilateral incentive to deviate from his proposed strategy in the hypothetical
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equilibrium. For any offer ψ1 < ψ

1, the realtor should recommend ‘reject’.
Babbling regions solve the problem of the realtor’s incentive to misreport his
preferences in the first period. As we have seen, if the realtor’s recommendation
in period 1 changes the seller’s expectation of future offers but does not change the
seller’s action, the realtor will always choose to send the message that will make the
seller more pessimistic. Then in equilibrium, it cannot be the case that the realtor’s
first period recommendation changes the seller’s beliefs when it does not change the
seller’s first period action. Therefore, in the equilibrium I will consider, the realtor
will babble in the first period when his recommendation will not change the seller’s
action, and will report his own preference truthfully when his recommendation is
decisive for the seller’s action. The bottom panel of figure 7 illustrates the period 1
equilibrium, assuming that in the second period the seller and the realtor play the
same strategies as they did in the first period of the two-period model. The second
period equilibrium will then look like it does in Figure 4.
Because x̂1(z) must be estimated numerically, the expected sales price and ex-
pected time to sale must be simulated as well. Figure 8 shows the results from
such a simulation. The general pattern from the two-period model remains intact:
as aggregate demand rises, the expected sales price rises and the expected time on
market mostly falls. However, there is a slight bump in the expected time to sale for
high levels of z. This is due to the upward-sloping portion of x̂1(z), which causes the
realtor to recommend rejecting a higher percentage of offers when z is high. Overall,
however, the correlation between expected sales price and expected time to sale is
negative, and the simulated results of the three period model are consistent with the
stylized facts observed in the data.
I used the following algorithm for finding the realtor’s cutoff rule x̂1(z) in the three
period model:
1. Pick a candidate schedule for x̂1(z). In practice I chose x̂1(z) = x for all z.
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2. On a fine grid of points for z:
(a) Go through a fine grid of points for all values of x to create a grid of all
values of ψ consistent with each value of z.
(b) Calculate z̃L,1 and z̃H,1 for each value of ψ conditional on the realtor rec-
ommending ‘reject’.
(c) For each value of ψ, find the expected value of the idiosyncratic component
of the realtor’s payoff if the seller rejects the first period offer. Denote
this value xR. For a fixed z, this gives xR as a function of x.
(d) Find the fixed point of xR(x); use this value as the new candidate for x̂1(z).
3. Repeat this procedure using the new schedule for x̂1(z) until the maximum
distance between the old and new schedules is below a specified tolerance level.
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Figure 4.1: Housing Market Time Series 1983q1-2010q4
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Figure 4.2: Expected Values of ψ2 as a function of ψ1























































Figure 4.3: Expected Time to Sale and Sales Price without Realtor
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Figure 4.4: Expected Values of ψ2 as a function of ψ1
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Figure 4.5: Expected Time to Sale and Sales Price with Realtor
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Figure 4.6: Realtor’s Optimal Cutoff Rule in First Period of Three-Period Model
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Figure 4.7: Seller’s Expected Value of waiting for Period 2 in 3-period Model
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Figure 4.8: Expected Time to Sale and Sales Price in 3-period Model
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Figure 4.9: Percent Price Change from 2000: Perceived and Zillow (States)



































































































































































































































































































Figure 4.10: Misperceptions Index and Home Sales (States)
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